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Abstract 
This thesis develops the two, interconnected narratives of two African Americans, Lloyd Lionel 
Gaines and Lucile Harris Bluford.  Specifically, the work explores the two plaintiffs’ attempts 
for admission to the University of Missouri graduate schools and the subsequent legal cases 
brought on their behalf by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as 
part of its campaign for educational equality.  Given the relative lack of scholarship on both legal 
cases, the development of the two narratives will provide comprehensive understandings of the 
plaintiffs and how their legal cases worked within the NAACP’s strategy.  Relatedly, this thesis 
will build a strong historical connection between the two cases and argue that they need to be 
viewed as one, interdependent history.  This explanation will encompass the plaintiffs’ personal 
influence to initiate an attempt for admission, the connected nature of the two legal cases in the 
context of Missouri, and their significance within the NAACP’s national legal strategy.  The 
histories of Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford are incomplete; this thesis will provide a more 
complete narrative and understanding of the two plaintiffs, their respective legal challenges, and 
posit a new framework of the two narratives as one interconnected history in the national 
NAACP campaign for educational equality. 
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 1 
Introduction 
  Equipped with a financial commitment made from the left-leaning Garland Fund in 
1930, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) began to 
formulate a coordinated legal campaign to attack segregation—specifically with its campaign for 
educational equality—in the United States.  The alliance, though tenuous, set in motion the first 
steps that would lead to the landmark victory of Brown v. Board of Education in the United 
States Supreme Court, which set a precedent in education contrary to the Plessy v. Ferguson 
decision.  Despite the campaign ending in a triumphant victory, the path along the way included 
many challenges, obstacles, and victories.  Encountering funding difficulties, ill-prepared 
plaintiffs, excited local attorneys, decisive victories, evolving opposition, and even mysterious 
disappearances, the historical narratives of the campaign for educational equality ran the gamut.  
Despite the obvious differences of each legal case brought forth by the NAACP, the campaign 
contained many common threads and similar progressions, though at the time the campaign and 
its strategy may not have been as cohesive as the NAACP desired.  
 These common threads occurred in and throughout the various arms of the broader 
struggle to end segregation in America.  One of these arms focused on equalizing and integrating 
graduate and professional schools.  Seen as critical, graduate and professional schools became a 
starting point to ending the “separate but equal” doctrine in lower levels of education given the 
non-existence of graduate schools in southern states.  The legal cases and the explorations of 
legal action against Upper South states and their state universities constituted a large part of the 
NAACP’s strategy and efforts in the 1930s and early 1940s.  In spite of this importance, existing 
civil rights literature does not adequately explore the histories of the individual cases or the legal 
cases’ combined significances. The overall purpose of this work is to develop the narratives of 
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two relatively unknown legal cases, Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada, both of which 
attempted to integrate graduate schools at the University of Missouri.  Due to numerous reasons 
and factors, I will argue that these two cases need to be viewed as one interconnected history: on 
a personal level, based on the similarities and evolution of the two legal cases, and within the 
national NAACP campaign and strategy to end educational segregation. 
 First, it is necessary to explain the development of the NAACP’s coordinated legal 
campaign as well as the first significant case—Murray v. Pearson (Murray v. Maryland)—prior 
to the Gaines and Bluford cases.1  It is critical to understand how the NAACP chose to attack 
graduate education, the historical actors involved in the development of the campaign, the actual 
legal cases, and the factors the NAACP found to be vital to success and sustainability.  
Following this introduction to the campaign and the NAACP’s strategy, I will elaborate more 
extensively on the purpose of the work, the contribution to the literature, and, specifically, what 
the work intends to prove. 
The Strategic Development of the NAACP’s Campaign for Educational Equality 
 By 1926, the NAACP began to slowly shift its attention and resources toward 
coordinated legal campaigns seeing an opportunity with the creation of left-leaning American 
Fund for Public Service (AFPS).2  Charles Garland—an inheritor of one million dollars from his 
father—founded and funded the American Fund for Public Service.  As a self-identified liberal, 
Garland desired radical change in the United States and to achieve this purpose he created the 
AFPS—more commonly known as the Garland Fund.3  After the founding of the Garland Fund, 
                                                
1 The court case Murray v. Pearson is more commonly referred to as Murray v. Maryland and 
will be referred to as such in this thesis. 
2 Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, (The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1987), 1-2.  
3 The American Fund for Public Service will be referred to as the Garland Fund. 
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James Weldon Johnson—then NAACP Secretary— joined the board of directors, thus creating 
an early link with the wealthy and left-leaning organization and the NAACP.4  Despite the early 
connection, there were clear ideological divides among the Garland Fund’s board of directors.  
Many of the white leftists emphasized economic means for radical change in the United States. 
However when it came time to apply for Garland Fund grants to fight segregation, the NAACP 
and Johnson stood firm with their belief that legal victories were precursors to economic change 
and that legal recourse would be the most prosperous route to their end goals.5  Examining the 
debates between the Garland Fund and the NAACP, Mark Tushnet concluded, “that litigation 
was a choice made by the NAACP in the face of arguments that other ways of using its resources 
would be more productive.”6  The NAACP in continuing with its original framework for social 
and legal change would lay the groundwork for future and sustained legal successes. 
 As the NAACP continually applied and negotiated for grant funds, the Garland Fund 
pressed the NAACP not only on economic issues but also specific details of its strategies.  In 
1930, the Garland Fund tentatively approved a $100,000 grant for the NAACP to fight 
segregation but the Board of Directors awaited more details.  Walter White, the acting NAACP 
secretary, addressed the Garland Fund’s concerns by submitting a combined proposal addressing 
the lack of representation on grand juries and residential segregation.  Additionally for the first 
time, White elaborated on a strategy focused on education in the Deep South.7  White explained: 
Such taxpayer suits…will (a) make the cost of a dual system so prohibitive as to 
speed the abolishment of segregated schools; (b) serve as examples and will give 
courage to Negroes to bring similar actions; (3) cases will likely be appealed by 
                                                
4 Ibid., p. 2. 
5 Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, p. 7. 
6 Ibid., p. 8. 
7 Ibid., p. 13. 
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city authorities, thus causing higher court decision[s] to cover wider territory; (4) 
focus as nothing else will public attention north and south on the vicious 
discrimination in the apportionment of public school funds.8 
While not explicitly naming graduate education, many of White’s points would be rehashed in 
future legal cases attempting to integrate and equalizing graduate and professional schools, such 
as those initiated by Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford in Missouri.  
 By May 1930, the Garland Fund finally passed the significant NAACP grant by a narrow 
margin of six to five.9  Next, the NAACP and the Garland Fund searched for a lawyer to map out 
its legal campaign and its corresponding strategies.  The NAACP hired Nathan Margold, a 
prominent white lawyer, to produce a report and formulate strategies to dismantle legal 
segregation in the south.  During Margold’s time with the NAACP, financial problems plagued 
both the NAACP and the Garland Fund, thus weakening an already precarious relationship.10  
Despite this, Margold finished a 218-page report and argued, “a direct attack on separate schools 
was both legally and politically possible.”11  In the report, Margold grouped southern states into 
three groups and analyzed how the NAACP should litigate the unequal education appropriations.  
Margold decided whether to bring cases to state or federal court, with what legal means, and if 
the NAACP should involve certain states at all.  Ultimately, Margold concluded “that the 
campaign should focus, instead [of on mandamus suits in state courts], on three easily proved 
facts: the state law required separate schools, that expenditures were obviously unequal, and that 
                                                
8 Ernst to White, Draft Report by Committee to Fund, NAACP Papers BOX I-C-196 (pre-May 
1930), quoted in Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, p. 13-14. 
9 Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, p. 14. 
10 Ibid., p. 15. 
11 Ibid., p. 26. 
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state remedies were in practice unavailable.”12  Margold’s work built a substantial reserve of 
detailed research and designed preliminary strategies his successors would utilize. 
In comparison to the Walter White’s original proposal, the Margold Report differed in 
that it emphasized detail about different technical strategies of attacking segregation, arguing that 
bringing the fight to the Deep South was in fact possible.  Tushnet’s analysis of the evolution of 
the NAACP’s proposals to the Garland Fund, the Margold Report, and the future actions of 
Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall serve to show that the legal strategies were in flux but 
its common goals always remained.  Tushnet later characterized these changes and 
transformations as “tactical flexibility” and “learning by doing.”13  In retrospect, it is easy to 
frame the evolution of legal campaign as very clear and apparent.  However upon closer 
examination, the strategies and specific tactics continuously changed, adapted, and narrowed due 
to leading personalities, responses by the states, and available opportunities.  Thus, it is 
necessary to delve deeper into how specific legal cases operated within the national strategic 
framework. 
 As Margold finalized his report, finances and strategic debates continued to plague and 
slow down the NAACP’s attempt to start its legal campaign.  Eventually, Nathan Margold’s 
influence waned as he insisted on waiting for a fully funded campaign, which many of the 
NAACP leaders recognized as a pipedream during the Great Depression.14  Margold and the 
NAACP eventually went their separate ways.  Despite the separation, Margold provided another 
analysis and point of view that shaped the NAACP’s legal strategy.  Margold’s understanding 
                                                
12 Ibid., p. 26-27. 
13 Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, p. 50, 68. 
14 Ibid., p. 29. 
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and opinions on the campaign for educational equality would not be the final word on the legal 
campaign’s evolution. 
Charles Hamilton Houston and Race Leadership 
 With Margold’s exit, the NAACP sought a black lawyer who could excite their local 
branches and the black community—a characteristic Margold did not possess.  Walter White, the 
NAACP’s Secretary, tapped Charles Hamilton Houston—the long time special NAACP counsel 
and Dean of the Howard Law School—to become the NAACP’s leading lawyer.  Houston’s 
official appointment to the NAACP’s legal team indicated a changing of the guard and his 
subsequent legal strategies would take preeminence throughout the 1930s and 1940s and 
influence the work of his protégé and successor, Thurgood Marshall.  As a part time advisor for 
the NAACP in prior years, Houston watched the NAACP with one foot in and one foot out of the 
organization.  Houston’s dedication, work ethic, and ingenuity built him a strong rapport with the 
existing NAACP leadership where Walter White depended heavily on Houston.  White 
consistently “sought [Houston’s] advice on everything from legal matters to scheduling 
meetings.”15  The budding relationship evolved into the full-time appointment, which would be 
the first time Houston dedicated all of his efforts to NAACP work.  
Charles Houston—a son of a lawyer, a World War I veteran, Amherst College graduate, 
Harvard Law graduate, and the Dean of Howard Law School—was one of the most prominent 
black lawyers in the 1920s and 1930s.  As Houston spent time in the army, in higher education, 
and in private practice, he developed his own framework for social change that would later 
narrow the NAACP’s legal campaign to a few areas of emphasis, most notably the focus on 
graduate and professional schools.  Houston’s personal framework understood societal change in 
                                                
15 Rawn James Jr., Root and Branch: Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall, and the 
Struggle to End Segregation, (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 59. 
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terms of a top-down approach led by strong, ingenious race leaders.  In his own way, Houston 
was an acolyte of W.E.B. Du Bois’ “Talented Tenth” philosophy.  A few personal anecdotes 
illustrate how Houston came to embrace this social framework and they also explain his 
preference to first focus the legal campaign on graduate and professional schools.   
 As a young adult, Houston saw a need for strong, intelligent black leaders early on.  At 
twenty-one, Houston decided to enter the U.S. Army and fight in World War I, but he would 
only enlist and serve as an officer.  Houston welcomed Joel E. Springarn and W.E.B. Du Bois’ 
calls for separate officer training camps for black soldiers.16  Acting on this belief, Houston and 
other “similarly situated” young black enlistees “formed the Central Committee of Negro 
College Men to press the War Department for a training camp.”17  Many criticized the plan and 
desire for separate training arguing racial segregation was wrong in any form.  Despite the 
criticism, Houston and others black soldiers did not back down from their demand for separate 
officer training. 
The War Department responded indirectly by setting requirements that excluded many of 
the young black men involved in the committee, one of whom was Charles Houston who was 
eventually accepted after initially being rejected.18 Assigned at Fort Des Moines, Houston 
arrived early as to “not tak[e] a second chance on being rejected as too young.”19  After training 
extensively, the lead commander at Fort Des Moines recommended that white officers be put in 
charge of specialized black units until the black officers bettered their training and gained more 
                                                
16 Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil 
Rights, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 36. 
17 Ibid., p. 37. 
18 Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I 
Era, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 43. 
19 CHH, “Saving the World for Democracy,” Pittsburgh Courier, 20 July 1940, quoted in 
McNeil, Groundwork, p. 38. 
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experience.20  The black officers—including Houston—fervently protested the decision.  
Eventually, Houston and others black soldiers were assigned as unit officers only to be purposely 
set up for failure.  The white leadership placed black officers with poor units and then pointed to 
their lack of success as evidence of the black officers’ inherent inferiority.  Houston “raised hell 
about it in so far as one can raise hell inside the army” and continued to raise hell about 
numerous other incidents that showed the army’s indifference to black soldiers.21   
Houston’s time in the army reveals three characteristics that foreshadowed his work for 
the NAACP.  First, Houston clearly valued strong, black leaders and a type of leadership that 
would guide the black struggle in any arena, even the most trying of situations.  Secondly, 
Houston did not embody an absolutist approach to systemic change.  Houston was willing to 
have separate officer training, though it was not ideal.  This willingness to work within the 
system’s structure but also work toward substantial change.  Houston’s later legal cases would 
argue for educational equalization but subtly aimed for integration—a type of “hidden agenda”—
illustrated this mentality.  Lastly, despite the calculated maneuvering Houston displayed a 
fighting spirit, a sense of showmanship, and a strong inclination toward justice, all of which he 
demanded from his students and NAACP plaintiffs.  
 Another telling anecdote of the development of Charles Houston’s framework for social 
change is his time as Dean of the Howard Law School.  As a student at Harvard, Houston began 
to see the value of law and the importance of teaching it.  Houston envisioned himself as a 
teacher and desired “a thorough grounding in law so he could teach and practice with 
                                                
20 McNeil, Groundwork, p. 39. 
21 CHH to Thomas MacDonald, 12 June 1942, CHH/H&G firm files, quoted in McNeil, 
Groundwork, p. 41. 
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authority.”22  Quickly after his Harvard graduation and a brief stint in Spain, Houston accepted 
an offer to become a faculty member at Howard University in 1924.   A recognized young 
scholar, Houston worked tirelessly to become a better teacher spending hours preparing and 
challenging himself to improve on his weaknesses.  During his time as a professor, he stressed 
“about both the training of excellent lawyers and their continuing education” at Howard.23  
Accrediting institutions—the American Bar Association and Association of American Law 
Schools—also held concerns about Howard’s program and its graduates.  At the time, both 
associations had not yet granted the program official accreditation.24  Knowing this, Houston 
continued to voice concerns about the program’s rigor and purpose.  The new school president 
Mordecai Johnson responded to Houston’s preoccupations by naming him Resident Vice-Dean 
in 1929.  Rising to Dean of the law school in 1930, Houston was granted authority to make 
changes in curriculum and work toward achieving accreditation.  
As Dean, Houston rebuilt the Howard Law School in his own vision.  Viewing higher 
education and professional schools as sources of race leaders, Houston imagined Howard as an 
educational factory that trained and guided black, civil rights-focused lawyers in order to 
transform America.  However, this vision would come at a cost.  In transforming the law school, 
Houston provoked controversy by eliminating the popular night school, raising admission 
standards, and requiring more of the law students than ever before.25  Houston’s hard work paid 
off though.  In 1931, the Howard Law School was officially accredited—becoming the first 
predominantly black law school and one of “only seventy-one law schools in the United States” 
                                                
22 McNeil, Groundwork, p. 63 
23 Ibid., p. 67. 
24 Ibid., p. 69. 
25 Houston’s father and many other black lawyers benefited from the Howard night school since 
they were able to support themselves by keeping day jobs. 
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to receive such a distinction.26  Additionally, graduates of the Houston years, such as Thurgood 
Marshall, William Hastie, and Leon Ransom, became legendary civil rights litigators.  Houston 
saw his work and Howard’s Law program as integral to the creation of “social engineers” who 
held a “serious commitment to freedom and justice.”27  Houston’s transformation of the Howard 
Law School demonstrated once again his belief that social change was predicated on strong, 
intelligent race leaders.  The overarching vision typified in Howard’s dramatic changes would 
mirror the development of the NAACP’s first focus on graduate and professional schools in the 
campaign for educational equality. 
Charles Houston Begins with the NAACP 
 Houston split time with various projects as he climbed the leadership ranks at Howard.  
He and his father started their own private firm.  Houston also worked closely with the NAACP, 
participated in other pro-bono work, and taught and administered at Howard.  This heavy 
workload would eventually kill him in 1950.  However, after Nathan Margold’s work slowed 
with the NAACP, Secretary Walter White sought to bring Charles Houston fully into the 
NAACP fold as Special Counsel. Houston—intrinsically drawn to the NAACP’s work—finally 
decided to lead the legal team full-time in June 1935 after taking a leave of absence from 
Howard.28   
 As Special Counsel, Houston analyzed the legal strategies and research created by his 
predecessor and surveyed the legal and societal landscape.  Seeing the breadth of the previous 
plans and the funding commitments continuing to dwindle, Houston narrowed the central focus 
of the legal campaign to education.  The widespread approach proposed earlier by White and 
                                                
26 McNeil, Groundwork, p. 74. 
27 Ibid., p. 85. 
28 Ibid., p. 116. 
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Margold depended on substantial financial backing, something that the NAACP expected but did 
not fully receive from the Garland Fund.  If the NAACP continued with the proposed larger 
strategy Houston argued it would have resulted in meaningless “isolated suits.”29  However, if 
there “was a planned legal program that laid a ‘foundation’ with respect to research, cases and 
community involvement in struggle against racial discrimination and for equal rights” success 
would be more attainable.30  Houston’s plans began to take shape as he funneled many of the 
broader ideas and legal strategies into tangible, more short-term, and more manageable goals and 
means. Houston emphasized three significant areas: 1) an emphasis on making educational 
segregation “too expensive to maintain” 2) creating excitement and strengthening local black 
communities 3) and developing procedures in cases on higher education that engaged 
communities could follow and replicate with their own resources.31  Unlike Margold, “Houston 
was more pragmatic” and by focusing the campaign and its legal strategy on singular and stark 
examples such as graduate education the NAACP would be more successful.32 
Given the financial difficulties of the decade, Houston foresaw the need to foment legal 
action locally without the need for substantial national funds.  Bringing legal cases against 
institutions of higher education, in Houston’s estimation, would create streamlined arguments, 
strategies, and demonstrate the stark inequalities, all of which would help inform local branches 
and attorneys to take up in their own legal cases—semi-independently moving the campaign for 
educational equality forward.  This differed greatly from Margold’s plan, which measured 
                                                
29 CHH, “Memorandum for the Joint Committee of the NAACP and the American Fund for 
Public Service, Inc.”, AFPS-Joint Committee, 1933-35 folder, AFPS, C199, NAACP Records, 
quoted McNeil, Groundwork, p. 117. 
30 McNeil, Groundwork, p. 117. 
31 Ibid., p. 116. 
32 Yvonne Ryan, Roy Wilkins: The Quiet Revolutionary and the NAACP, (University Press of 
Kentucky, 2013), 24. 
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success mainly through “legal terms” and lack of attention “to the use of publicity within the 
black community as a method of community organization.”33  Houston knew from previous 
experience that an excited, energized, and engaged black public was extremely beneficial.  If the 
NAACP could effectively include local branches, the prospects for success were much greater 
than essentially trudging through the campaign independently.  
Understanding the limitations of moral arguments, Houston and the NAACP wanted to 
hurt state budgets by forcing state legislatures to choose between establishing costly segregated 
graduate institutions and admitting black students to their beloved state universities.  Holding 
graduate schools in high esteem, Houston strategically saw higher education as a starting point 
for the campaign.  Additionally, Houston rationalized that if black students had access to higher 
education they would then turn into leaders committed and trained to fight for the race as a 
whole.  Thus, it is recognizable why Houston favored addressing graduate and professional 
schools first in the campaign for educational equality. 
The “Nonexistence” of Graduate and Professional Schools in the South  
 Above all, the NAACP desired to end the doctrine of “separate but equal” that prevailed 
throughout the Jim Crow South.  History demonstrated that separate could rarely, if ever, be 
considered equal.  Yet, it remained difficult to argue equality within the courts and among state 
legislatures.  The area of graduate and professional schools offered a rare opportunity for the 
NAACP.  In the South, graduate and professional schools for black students were completely 
nonexistent, which invalidated the principles behind the “separate but equal” doctrine.  Houston 
and the NAACP believed that the absence of graduate schools and the exorbitant cost of creating 
                                                
33 Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, p. 28. 
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segregated equal institutions would force the states into capitulating and perhaps accepting 
integration. 
 The question, though, was where in the South would the NAACP look to find plaintiffs 
and bring cases to court?  Houston figured that the Upper South states presented the best 
opportunity for success and being from the Washington, D.C. area Charles Houston was familiar 
with region’s political and social characteristics.  States such as Virginia, Maryland, and 
Missouri were culturally southern but were not exact replicas of their Deep South counterparts.  
The Upper South states enforced a greyer interpretation of segregation and possessed a 
conflicted cultural personality.  In his scholarship on working class politics in St. Louis, Clarence 
Lang writes that St. Louis was “a site of political convergence and contradiction between the 
[North and the South].”34  Segregation in St. Louis, illustrative of other Upper South cities, was 
described as “unevenly applied… [and] in those arenas in which segregation was either law or 
custom, it was applied strictly and rigidly.”35  Lucile Bluford highlighted this uneven nature 
when she explained she did not enjoy the Jim Crow streetcars in Atlanta yet she returned to 
Kansas City, Missouri and fought an adamantly segregated university system.36  Simplistically, 
the characterization of St. Louis can be broadly applied to many of Upper South cities and states.  
These states maintained a “southern” temperament but due to their location, a hodgepodge of 
ideological demographics, and their economics they could not be considered fully southern in 
                                                
34 Clarence Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics and Black Freedom Struggle in St. 
Louis, 1936-1975, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009), p. 9. 
35 Joseph Heathcott, “Black Archipelago: Politics and Civic Life in the Jim Crow City,” Journal 
of Social History 38, no. 3 (Spring, 2005): 710. Accessed March 30, 2015. 
http://www.jstor.org.www2.lib.ku.edu/stable/3790652. 
36 Lucile H. Bluford, interview by Fern Ingersoll, May 15, 1989, Kansas City, transcript, p. 31, 
Women In Journalism oral history project, Washington Press Club, Washington, D. C. 
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nature.  The legal, political, and social situation provided the NAACP just enough leeway that 
the leadership foresaw potential success. 
 Specifically with regard to graduate schools, the accompanying educational policies 
embodied this conflicted but predominantly southern attitude toward segregation.  Some states in 
the Upper South provided scholarships to black students wanting to study at a graduate level.  
These scholarships provided funds for the black students to go to other state schools—mainly 
adjacent northern states—that admitted black students.  The funds were consistently exhausted 
and students were often turned away, effectively denying them of any educational opportunities 
beyond undergraduate education in segregated state schools.  Despite the funding problems, the 
Upper South attempted at least on paper to play by the rules laid down by Plessy v. Ferguson 
unlike their counterparts in the Deep South. 
 The complicated nature of the Upper South states’ handling of graduate education 
provided the perfect opportunity for the NAACP to push qualified plaintiffs into state 
universities under the guise of equalization.  The halfway attempt to comply with Plessy v. 
Ferguson muddied the legal waters and thus presented legal opportunities to expose deep 
hypocrisy and contradictions instead of attempting to fight absolutism in the Deep South.  For 
Houston and the NAACP, the Upper South and its graduate education system represented the 
most strategic, economic, and prosperous route to achieving their goals.  
Murray v. Maryland  
 In 1934, Alpha Phi Alpha—Charles Houston and Thurgood Marshall’s fraternity—was in 
the process of conducting a search for a plaintiff to test the University of Maryland and its 
exclusion of black students.  Initially, Houston and Marshall were not involved in this legal 
battle.  Belford V. Lawson Jr., fraternity’s assistant general counsel, was spearheading the case.  
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Marshall, however, doubted the legal aptitude and ability of Lawson.  Aware of his fraternity 
brother’s apprehension, Lawson invited Marshall to a strategy meeting in an attempt to include 
him, ease his fears, and garner NAACP support for the fraternity-led legal case.  Unimpressed 
and still concerned, Marshall refused to support the fraternity’s case and planned with Houston 
to take over the pending action against the University of Maryland. 37  However, both groups still 
needed a plaintiff. 
 Lawson and Alpha Phi Alpha found nine potential plaintiffs from which to choose—all 
of whom had been denied admission to the University of Maryland because of their race in the 
years 1933 and 1934.  Quickly after his meeting with Marshall, Lawson identified Donald 
Gaines Murray as the best choice for a successful plaintiff.38  Donald Gaines Murray—a 1934 
graduate from Amherst College—was considered academically qualified and well suited for 
potential legal action.39  Confident, Lawson prepared his arguments under the assumption that 
Murray would be his plaintiff and that the fraternity would continue without NAACP support.  
However, Marshall and Houston quickly took over the case and represented Donald Murray, 
effectively excluding Lawson and the fraternity from their own efforts.40  Houston and Marshall 
did not fully trust their fraternity to execute a legal case effectively.  However, the two’s 
familiarity with Maryland and their connection to Donald Murray—both he and Houston were 
alumni of Amherst College—made them feel comfortable with moving forward with the case.   
 The University of Maryland was the only institution of higher education in Maryland that 
offered an accredited legal education.  To serve its black citizens, Maryland founded the Princess 
                                                
37 James, Root and Branch, p. 66-67. 
38 Ibid., p. 67. 
39 “The University of Maryland Versus Donald Gaines Murray,” Journal of Negro Education 5, 
no. 2 (Apr., 1936): 166-167, accessed March 24, 2015. 
http://www.jstor.org.www2.lib.ku.edu/stable/2292154. 
40 James, Root and Branch, p. 67-68. 
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Anne Academy in 1886.  However, the NAACP and many of Maryland’s black citizens 
considered the Princess Anne Academy wholly unequal.  In addition, the Academy did not 
provide legal education.  The NAACP’s case in Maryland highlighted both the lack of graduate 
legal education and also the egregious unequal nature of all of Princess Anne Academy’s 
programs—a reflection of segregated education throughout the state.      
By 1935, Donald Murray had applied to the University of Maryland and was rejected 
based solely on him being black.  In response, Houston and the NAACP brought Murray’s 
complaint to state court on June 18, 1935 “in a relatively empty courtroom.”41  The Maryland’s 
black community and press approached the proceedings and results with “guarded optimism,” a 
response that would mirror the Lloyd Gaines Supreme Court victory three years later.42  When 
the court proceedings began, the first twist occurred when Thurgood Marshall—commonly 
believed to be the chief counsel of the Murray case—rose to ask for pro hac vice, “for this 
particular occasion.”43  Marshall planned for Houston—a member of the D.C. bar—to try the 
Maryland case but Marshall needed permission to do so. The permission was granted and the 
case began with Houston leading the NAACP’s arguments.  
 Surprisingly, Judge Eugene O’Dunne—a generally sympathetic jurist—first asked the 
assistant attorney general, Charles T. LeViness III, if Murray had been denied solely based him 
being black.  LeViness conceded that the University of Maryland did in fact deny Murray based 
on his race.44  This concession erased the need for the hours of Houston and Marshall’s 
preparation both of who anticipated lengthy arguments centering on their plaintiff’s academic 
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and personal merits.  In effect, the concession simplified the case without much effort.  Maryland 
relied on the fact that there had been appropriations for scholarships for black students to study 
elsewhere.  However, Houston easily pointed out that “the state created them only after Murray’s 
application was rejected.”45  Continuing on, Houston and Marshall criticized the Maryland 
officials by elaborating on how decrepit the Princess Anne Academy accommodations and 
facilities were and how grossly unequal Maryland’s segregated education was across all 
educational levels.  The strength of the NAACP’s argument combined with little evasion by state 
officials made the decision by Judge Eugene O’Dunne relatively easy.  The judge issued a writ 
of mandamus obliging the University of Maryland to admit Donald Gaines Murray to its School 
of Law. 
 The victory in Murray v. Maryland was tremendous for the NAACP.  The NAACP’s first 
real attempt to test a state university to equalize or to integrate a graduate school had gone 
seamlessly.  The Baltimore Afro-American summed up Maryland’s weak defense in an editorial 
title, “Md. U. Defended Lily-White Policy with Wooden Guns.”46  The ease in which the 
NAACP had stormed the castle would not be indicative of future battles in other states. 
The NAACP did not independently find the plaintiff and develop its case.  The conflict 
between the NAACP and the fraternity led to intra-politics among the organizations that 
depended on one another.  Future cases would not be void of politics but these politics were 
often contained within the NAACP leadership structure.  Moreover, Maryland was too slow to 
implement its stalling legislation—out-of-state scholarships.  The attempt by Maryland to create 
such legislation, albeit too late, foreshadowed legislation created by other state universities and 
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legislatures who desired to slow the NAACP’s legal action and success.  Lastly, the decision was 
only an individual mandamus decision in a state court.  It did not contain a national precedent or 
decide on established Maryland laws governing segregation.  The decision simply stated that 
because there was no other option available to Murray—segregated or integrated options—he 
must be admitted.  If there had been established segregated options in Maryland, the case may 
have taken a similar, complicated path of the Gaines and Bluford cases.  Ironically, to be the 
most effective the NAACP needed to lose multiple times in order to appeal to federal courts.  
Despite the shortcomings hidden within the decisive victory, Murray v. Maryland was significant 
in boosting the NAACP’s hopes and providing it with a glimpse as to how its opponents would 
respond. 
The Interconnected Histories of Lloyd Lionel Gaines and Lucile Harris Bluford 
 Maryland proved to be the first successful testing ground for the NAACP’s legal strategy 
in the campaign for educational equality.  However, efforts to cultivate other potential challenges 
following the Murray decision were surprisingly difficult though, one plaintiff—and later 
another—in Missouri stepped forward and thus Missouri became the next NAACP civil rights 
battleground.  Those two plaintiffs were Lloyd Lionel Gaines of St. Louis and Lucile Harris 
Bluford of Kansas City.  This thesis seeks to explore the interconnected histories surrounding the 
two plaintiffs, their respective legal cases, and their place in the national NAACP legal strategy. 
 At the present, the literature exploring the legal cases of Gaines and Bluford is 
extraordinarily limited.  Despite many scholars declaring the Gaines victory—Gaines v. 
Canada—one of the most important civil rights victories of the 1930s, development of the two 
Missouri cases’ narrative, the strategy involved, and the scholarly interventions are minimized to 
a few pages in wider histories of the time period.  This inadequate development of the Gaines 
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narrative is easily outdone by the almost complete exclusion of Lucile Bluford, who followed 
Gaines and was the first person to test Gaines’ U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  However, the 
scholars who have delved into both of the narratives of Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford are 
significant contributors to this thesis.  The lack of scholarship warrants further investigation, 
development, and interventions into the civil rights and NAACP literature.  In the three chapters 
of this thesis I will attempt to fill some of the void in the scholarship of the NAACP’s Missouri 
plaintiffs.  Additionally, I will intervene with regard to the need to frame the two narratives as 
one, interconnected history in the campaign for educational equality. 
 In the first chapter, I will better develop the Lloyd Gaines narrative.  Utilizing the limited 
resources, I will develop the narrative of Gaines’ early life and college years that led up to his 
disappearance.  While not directly related to his legal case and the NAACP, Gaines’ early life 
and time in college undergird a new understanding of the challenges Gaines faced and, 
ultimately, what can be concluded about his fate.  Following this exploration, I will develop the 
narrative surrounding Gaines’ attempt for admission to the University of Missouri and his 
subsequent NAACP supported legal case.  Drawing from primary and secondary sources, I will 
explore the initiation of Gaines’ attempt, the local support, the NAACP’s strategy, Missouri’s 
strategy and responses, the court proceedings and results, and the victory’s significance. 
 In the second chapter, I will focus on Lucile Bluford.  Due to Lucile Bluford’s rise to 
prominence as a journalist, much of her early life has been documented.  However, I will frame 
her early life as a foreshadowing of her life-long fight against inequality, with an emphasis of the 
years leading up to her legal case.  Bluford’s time at the University of Kansas, her work with The 
Kansas City Call—Kansas City’s premier black newspaper—and her NAACP involvement 
contribute to making Bluford an ideal plaintiff for the NAACP; one drawn to the NAACP’s work 
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and someone who despised injustice.  Following Bluford’s biographical narrative leading up to 
her attempt for admission at the University of Missouri, I will explain how Bluford became 
interested in testing the Gaines’ precedent and how the NAACP transitioned between the Gaines 
and Bluford legal challenges.  Tracing the subsequent court proceedings, I will demonstrate how 
the NAACP, the state of Missouri, and the University of Missouri adapted since Gaines v. 
Canada proceedings and the U.S. Supreme Court decision.  I will also show how the NAACP 
argument shifted to equality as the University of Missouri and the Missouri State Legislature 
willingly provided segregated graduate schools.  Lastly, Bluford’s history along with the Lloyd 
Gaines narrative is the basis from which I argue how the legal cases need to be historically 
framed. 
 In the third chapter, I present my central argument that within the context of the NAACP 
strategy and on multiple interconnected levels the historical narratives of Lloyd Gaines and 
Lucile Bluford need to be framed as one interconnected, dependent history.  This historical 
framework will better develop the understanding of the NAACP decision to use multiple 
lawsuits against the same university in order to make compliance with the “separate but equal” 
doctrine with regard to graduate education fiscally irresponsible.   
I will support the overarching argument by demonstrating the connection between Lloyd 
Gaines and Lucile Bluford on three levels: a personal level, the connection of the individual legal 
cases within the context of Missouri, and in the national NAACP legal strategy.  Beyond the 
relationship of the Gaines and Bluford narratives to the larger legal campaign, the two plaintiffs 
and their cases are intrinsically linked by Bluford’s admission that she was inspired and curious 
to test the University of Missouri because of the Gaines victory—which fulfilled the strategic 
premonition of many NAACP leaders.  The second level of connection lies within the actual 
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cases on the state level.  The two legal actions viewed together show continuity and an evolution 
of thought and action by the same legal teams.  Furthermore, the interconnected nature of the two 
cases was perfectly encapsulated during the year of 1939 and its events, which affected Missouri 
as a whole.  I will argue the Gaines and Bluford cases intersect and are historically dependent on 
one another.  On a larger scale, the two were critical and the first pair of plaintiffs to test and 
further develop the NAACP’s national strategy of overwhelming state universities with 
litigation, expanding demands for integration, and forcing costly equalization legislation.  Simply 
put, the two legal cases were connected on multiple levels that demonstrate significance beyond 
the simple understanding of individual cases. 
 Lloyd Gaines’ victory in the United States Supreme Court was monumental for the future 
legal successes of the NAACP.  However, understanding the Gaines victory in terms of what 
came next is vital to the broader civil rights struggle of the era.  Thus, it is imperative to view 
Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada as one interconnected history because of the personal 
influence of the plaintiffs, the evolution of both the cases in the context of Missouri, and the 
impact of the cases’ dual nature within the broader NAACP legal strategy for the campaign for 
educational equality. 
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Chapter 1 
Setting the Precedent: Gaines v. Canada 
 Regarded as one of the most influential civil rights victories of the 1930s—if not the most 
influential—Gaines v. Canada set the first national precedent in the campaign for educational 
equality.  Initiated by a young man named Lloyd Lionel Gaines and supported by the St. Louis 
NAACP branch as well as the national NAACP organization, the victorious case and the 
precedent provided a critical laboratory for testing states and state universities’ policies regarding 
segregation.  The precedent and momentum gained by the victory would be tested by Gaines’ 
mysterious disappearance in 1939.  However, the legal and strategic significance of Gaines v. 
Canada would be lasting and in turn dramatically affected Lucile Bluford and her legal case—
Bluford v. Canada—that followed Gaines v. Canada. 
 Scholarship regarding Gaines v. Canada and Lloyd Gaines’ story is widespread but not 
substantial, despite the notoriety of the case.  In this chapter, I build a fuller narrative and picture 
of Lloyd Gaines—though knowledge of his personal life is not extensive—the NAACP’s 
strategy for the case, the court proceedings, the University of Missouri’s dialogue on the case, 
and Gaines v. Canada’s significance in the wake of the Murray v. Maryland victory.  This 
chapter will explore many nuances and details that highlight the significance of Lloyd Gaines 
and his legal case in the national campaign for educational equality.   
Gaines’ personal life provides insight into the type of plaintiff the NAACP wanted and 
gives clues as to his fate, which is still unknown today.  Additionally with a more in-depth 
narrative and analysis of Gaines v. Canada, one can better understand that Lloyd Gaines and his 
attempt to integrate the University of Missouri are not just a footnoted victory but rather 
demonstrative of the larger NAACP legal strategy.  The conversations, correspondence, and 
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proceedings of the case show evolving strategies and responses by the NAACP and the 
defending state universities.  The narrative development and analysis of Gaines will provide a 
basis which I will connect to the succeeding Missouri legal case—Bluford v. Canada—creating a 
historically valuable link between the two interconnected histories.  Explanations and evidence 
of this connection will further illuminate the larger strategy and framework of the NAACP’s 
legal campaign.   
“Mississippi to St. Louis” 
 Lloyd Lionel Gaines was born the seventh son to Callie and Henry Gaines in 1911 in 
Water Valley, Mississippi outside of Oxford.  By the time Gaines reached the age of four his 
family was reduced from thirteen members to eight members due to “sickness and accident.”  
The losses included his father, who had been a rural schoolmaster but then turned to tenant 
farming to support his family. 47  Throughout the tumultuous times, the Gaines family continued 
to live in Mississippi for a number of years.  In 1926, when Gaines was fifteen, the family—now 
consisting of Callie Gaines and five children—moved to St. Louis where the family’s two oldest 
sons were living.  The move made the Gaines family “a part of the great ex[o]dus of Negroes 
from the rural South to northern cities during the decade following the close of the World 
War.”48  Lloyd Gaines, in his biographical sketch written for the NAACP, explained that unlike 
others he was proud to be from the country, especially Mississippi.  In Gaines’ mind, the move 
from rural to urban “serve[d] to elevate one’s ambitions, broaden his general perspective, and to 
                                                
47 Lloyd Gaines, biographical sketch, folder 001509-014-0267 in Papers of the NAACP, Part 03: 
The Campaign for Educational Equality, Series A: Legal Department and Central Office 
Records, 1913-1940, (Library of Congress 2012).  
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give him a better understanding of life, its opportunities and limitations.”49  Lloyd Gaines would 
fully experience the opportunities and limitations of life as a young ambitious black citizen.   
 In St. Louis, Gaines arrived as a fifteen year old who had only completed a “rural” sixth 
grade education and was placed in the fifth grade “as a matter of policy.”50  Undaunted by the 
setback, Gaines rapidly progressed through the St. Louis “urban” education system and reached 
his appropriate grade level.  Once arriving at Vashon High School, Gaines excelled academically 
while working at the same time to help support his family.  Vashon High School—established 
one year after the Gaines family arrived in St. Louis—was built in response to demands from 
black citizen councils.  Black St. Louisans had another high school, Sumner High School, but 
northern migration by southern blacks caused severe overcrowding.51  The Black St. Louisans’ 
demands that resulted in the construction of Vashon High School underscored the civic 
organizations working on the ground in St. Louis and the willingness of white authorities to at 
least entertain the demands of black citizens.  
During high school, Gaines flew through his academic work in excellent fashion.  Gaines 
participated in the school paper and was a leader in the Honor Society, Student Council, Public 
Speaking Club, Debate Team, and Mathematics Club.  In addition to his schoolwork and 
activities, Gaines worked five hours “every evening after school…as [a] delivery boy for a drug 
store.”  The need to work through school dated back to grammar school when Gaines worked as 
a newspaper delivery boy to assist his family.52  Gaines’ financial limitations and difficulties 
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were present and persistent, though, at times, Gaines’ brother Milton and George aided him as 
went through his education.53  His work ethic and the related, built-up financial frustration would 
come to a head in Gaines’ final correspondence. 
Graduating as the valedictorian in 1931 after just three years at Vashon, Lloyd Gaines 
looked to higher education. After receiving a scholarship, Gaines enrolled in Stowe Teacher’s 
College in St. Louis and studied there for a year.  There, Gaines was a member—not a leader like 
most of his other activities—of the Junior NAACP.54  This is the only concrete evidence that 
Gaines was involved with the NAACP before his legal case and when he finally was placed on 
the membership rolls in March 1936.  After a year at Stowe College, Gaines transferred to 
Lincoln University—the historically black college located in Jefferson City, Missouri—where he 
studied history.  Gaines’ experience of opportunities and limitations would be no different in 
Jefferson City.  
At Lincoln, finances always were on Gaines’ mind.  In a letter to his brother George 
during his final semester, Gaines strategized as to how to pay for his books and discussed how 
working made it difficult to achieve good grades.55  Gaines continued to work throughout his 
college education both at Stowe College as a pharmacy’s deliveryman and at Lincoln University 
where he worked for a private family.56  Despite the constant financial constraints and stresses, 
Gaines graduated in 1935 as an honors student, the Senior Class President, and a member of 
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Alpha Phi Alpha—Charles Houston’s fraternity.57  Seeking further educational training and 
following his long-term career goal, Gaines decided to become a lawyer.  Gaines, however, 
wanted to attend law school in Missouri where black citizens were barred from the University of 
Missouri and there was no separate legal training available for black citizens.    
In its quest to integrate graduate education, the NAACP in its quest to integrate graduate 
education vetted plaintiffs to ensure airtight legal cases, as Charles Houston and the central 
NAACP leadership did not want to waste time, funds, and insinuate a conspiracy to upset the 
Southern status quo.  This strategy required qualified, willing, and sympathy-worthy plaintiffs.  
Lloyd Gaines fit the model and was recruited to the NAACP efforts in Missouri.  Gaines’ 
background—a poor migrant who had achieved much despite his financial struggles—
contributed to a sterling image of a successful, hardworking, young man limited in opportunities 
because of systemic racism.  This type of background, image, and reputation, was one the 
NAACP wanted to capitalize on in the courts and in public opinion. 
Though details regarding Lloyd Gaines’ personal life and upbringing are not exhaustive, 
the surviving documents and evidence assist in explaining some crucial aspects related to his 
legal case and disappearance.  Dating back to their time in Mississippi, the Gaines family 
struggled financially and the parents had been limited to a rural schooling.  Gaines was not listed 
on the NAACP membership rolls until March 5, 1936, months after his first attempt for 
admission.58  His only known involvement with the NAACP before the legal case was as a 
Junior NAACP member at Stowe College.  Preoccupied with work and school, Gaines seemed to 
have little time for substantial activist work, though, it would be wrong to assume he was 
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oblivious to the NAACP work being done around him.  It also appears his widowed mother was 
not tapped into or active in St. Louis activist circles, especially with the NAACP where she never 
appeared on the membership rolls throughout the Gaines case.   
Over time, the true motives of NAACP plaintiffs have been unearthed and there is great 
amount of variation between the plaintiffs.  At the time nearly every one of the plaintiffs 
maintained the same stated motivation: to attend graduate school and further their education.  
However, Lloyd Gaines’ background suggests that he probably did want to attend graduate 
school thus not feeding into the widespread argument of an NAACP conspiracy, which asserted 
the NAACP and its plaintiffs had no intention of actually attending graduate school but only 
desired to integrate and disrupt the segregated Southern tradition.   
Additionally, Lloyd Gaines’ financial background underscores some details and suggests 
some conclusions regarding his fate.  It is well documented that Gaines struggled financially.  
Near the end of his legal case, Gaines was upset that he could not find work and a sense of 
stability despite his sacrifices for the black race.  His family’s financial troubles and his own 
work history suggest that Gaines’ concerns and complaints around his disappearance were deep-
seated and not the result of one dramatic event. 
Lloyd Gaines’ early life paints a personal picture of an NAACP plaintiff who has become 
somewhat legendary and overshadowed by his disappearance.  Better understanding Lloyd 
Gaines as a person and his background shines light on two themes.  First, Lloyd Gaines’ life was 
not easy, especially financially.  Combined with the stress of the national attention, Gaines’ 
finances became a major topic of discussion and a point of stress, which can be argued, 
contributed significantly to his disappearance.  Secondly, Gaines’ background and educational 
goals indicated that perhaps Gaines’ motives were more than likely pure in applying for 
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admission to the University of Missouri.  This contrasts with the prevailing argument that the 
NAACP recruited plaintiffs not for the plaintiff’s personal benefit but rather to force integration 
onto the state universities.  
St. Louis and the Local NAACP Branch 
 Situated as one the eight most populous African American urban centers, St. Louis’ 
nickname as the “Gateway City” had unique implications with regard to race relations.59  As a 
city in a border state, St. Louis was a site of cultural, political, and economic convergence.  This 
convergence and social mixture created a complicated and conflicted society.  Like other Upper 
South states and cities, black St. Louisans encountered a complex Jim Crow system similar to the 
Deep South but not as ubiquitous.  In navigating this complicated segregated society though still 
extremely racist society, Black St. Louisans were, in some ways, afforded a type of social and 
political leeway unlike their southern counterparts. The black community—exemplified with the 
establishment of Vashon High School—took advantage of the limited freedom to improve their 
situation by pushing for changes, such as better accommodations, and more agreeable legislation.  
Similar to the reasoning behind the NAACP’s preference for focusing on the Upper South states, 
St. Louis and Missouri had obvious strains of southern culture but the southern characteristics 
were not all encompassing.  
 One of the building blocks of St. Louis’ black community was the growth of the local 
NAACP branch.  Located in one of the most populous black American cities, the St. Louis 
NAACP possessed the people and resources to draw from in order to build a nationally 
recognized and influential local branch.  As the NAACP sought out plaintiffs to test segregation 
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at graduate schools, St. Louis branch’s strength and support became a key component of the 
NAACP’s coordination and strategy in Missouri.   
 In 1935, the St. Louis NAACP leadership was concentrated in the hands of two lawyers: 
Henry Espy, the local president, and Sidney Redmond, the Chairman of the Executive 
Committee.60  In the years before and after the start of the Gaines legal proceedings, the St. Louis 
branch was active in pursuing legal cases in St. Louis, organizing the 1935 national NAACP 
convention, and growing its membership.  The national NAACP office also depended on the St. 
Louis branch to help start and advise smaller Missouri branches such as the one in neighboring 
St. Charles, Missouri.61  In a 1936 letter to the national NAACP office, William Pickens—the 
legendary NAACP orator and director of branches—commended the St. Louis branch leadership 
for their work and impressed that with “Redmond [the NAACP has] a National Director who is 
taking a leading role in LOCAL branch and campaign.”62  For Houston and the NAACP, St. 
Louis fulfilled the basic prerequisite for their legal campaign: a strong local infrastructure, 
cooperative leaders, and Missouri’s location in the Upper South.    
Laying the Groundwork 
 Missouri, like most Upper South states, maintained a complex adherence to Plessy v. 
Ferguson in higher education employing evasive out-of-state scholarship programs and an 
adamant attitude to maintain the status quo.  In order to lay the groundwork for success, the 
NAACP needed to understand the history, the laws, and the implementation of the scholarship 
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fund.  The overarching goal of this process was to determine where in the process was it 
blatantly unequal and plan to attack that point.   
In July 1935, Houston and the NAACP commissioned a report on Missouri higher 
education to be completed by St. Louis lawyer and NAACP leader, Sidney Redmond.  Houston 
and the NAACP on the east coast wanted to know the details of how Missouri operated their 
supposed “separate but equal” higher education system by sending black graduate students out of 
state with financial assistance.  Specifically, Houston desired information about legislation 
governing education, Missouri’s policies on the exclusion of black students, the demographics of 
the student body, the financial expenditures on higher education, and the facilities and salary 
distinctions between the University of Missouri and Lincoln University.  Houston also required 
more information about Missouri’s scholarship program, such as the history of the program, 
unequal burdens placed on black students, the number of students rejected, and the extent of 
Missouri’s effort to advertise the program.63  In short, Houston wanted to know everything and 
the extensive case files demonstrate this need to research, document, and study all aspects of 
potential cases.  
When Redmond completed the report, he answered many of Houston’s questions and 
gave him the background knowledge of the local Missouri situation.  It became clear that the 
NAACP needed to first address the scholarship program first in order to debate the next 
question—of whether or not segregated education was equal and break down that barrier.  If 
Missouri did not provide graduate education but rather sent black students to adjacent, white 
state universities, it would be impossible for the NAACP to argue against Missouri since the 
state was simply providing scholarships not necessarily the actual education.  The NAACP 
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needed to force Missouri to provide education—either segregated or integrated—to black 
students within the state’s borders in order to then prove Missouri segregated education system 
was inherently unequal.  
Lloyd Gaines—The Plaintiff  
 Following the education report, Sidney Redmond and the St. Louis NAACP looked for 
qualified plaintiffs to test the University of Missouri.  However, moving forward with many of 
these prospective plaintiffs proved difficult.  Redmond’s letter to Charles Houston explaining 
that two Lincoln University students were supposed to come and start the process of filing an 
application to Missouri but “neither [showed] up,” exemplified the NAACP’s struggles.64  
However, ten days later on August 27, 1935, Redmond wrote Houston again and indicated they 
had found their client, Lloyd Gaines, who independently applied to Missouri one month earlier 
and was ignored.  Now with Gaines as their plaintiff, the NAACP lawyers readied their strategy 
and plotted their course of action.  Despite having convinced Lloyd Gaines to be his client, 
Sidney Redmond had concerns because Gaines was difficult to get ahold of in the process’ early 
stages and Redmond had already been let down by other students.65  These concerns show an 
early sign of Gaines’ tendency to disappear for periods of time without contacting others.   
The NAACP recruitment of Lloyd Gaines began a working relationship positioned to test 
Missouri’s policies on segregation.  How this relationship actually came to be appears to 
constitute a slight historical debate.  Sidney Redmond addressing Gaines in an interview simply 
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said that Gaines came to him and then they filed his application together.66  Redmond explained 
further: 
[Gaines] came to my office and talked to me about going to the 
University of Missouri. I said, “A man with your qualifications and 
ability ought to be an asset to the school. And if you really want to 
apply yourself and study, you should go. And all you need to do is 
to file an application.” And he says, “Well, now, what kind of 
application should it be?” And I just reached in my desk there and 
got out a postal card, you know, one of these stamped cards, and 
told him to write the registrar and ask him to send you an 
application blank.67 
Nathaniel (N.A.) Sweets, another St. Louis NAACP leader, later explained, in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s the St. Louis black community was creating many educational opportunities for 
young black students.  For college students, Sweets said that he and others sent young people to 
Lincoln University because “[they] couldn’t get into the University of Missouri.”  According to 
Sweets, he and Gaines had been close and when Gaines graduated from Lincoln Sweets 
encouraged him to apply to Missouri’s law school.  Sweets also applied for the journalism 
program at the same time, a fact that would be used in the Bluford case.68  The exact situation 
and setting in which Gaines was encouraged to be supported by the NAACP is somewhat 
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unclear.  However, it is apparent that local NAACP leaders were key to bringing Gaines into the 
fold as a plaintiff and then supporting his legal case.   
Although the details of the connection between Gaines and the St. Louis NAACP are 
unclear, St. Louis NAACP stayed active in finding potential plaintiffs and was in communication 
with Lincoln University about this objective.  Sidney Redmond and the St. Louis NAACP also 
developed a strong relationship with the national NAACP leadership, which was demonstrated 
when the national office tasked the St. Louis branch with hosting the 1935 national convention.  
The preparations and aftermath of the convention involved lengthy, thorough, and sometimes 
contentious communication between local and national leaders, intertwining the two groups even 
further.  Charles Houston and Sidney Redmond—both alumni of Harvard Law School—
appeared to have met in person numerous times such as at the 1935 National Bar Association 
convention in Nashville, Tennessee.  Here, Houston gave a speech entitled “Proposed Legal 
Attacks on Educational Discrimination,” which was undoubtedly heard by many of the black 
lawyers in the Upper South such as Redmond.69  These meetings furthered the two’s relationship 
and fomented more cooperation between St. Louis and the national office, especially with regard 
to the campaign for educational equality.  
The First Application with the NAACP 
On August 19, 1935, Gaines—with the support of Redmond, Espy, and Lincoln Professor 
Z. D. Lenoir—applied to Missouri’s Law School for a second time.  To complete his application, 
Gaines also requested his credits from Lincoln University President Charles Florence, who told 
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Henry Espy that “he would cooperate in everyway possible.”70  In spite of having sent his 
credits, application, and a letter to the university’s registrar S.W. Canada—who became the 
primary defendant—Gaines did not hear back.  The first correspondence in regards to his 
application to Missouri came from Charles Florence and Lincoln University.  Florence expressed 
that he heard from officials at Missouri about Gaines’ application and was instructed to tell 
Gaines that he needed to apply for an out-of-state scholarship through Lincoln University.71  This 
correspondence demonstrates Missouri’s early and consistent strategy of evasion and shifting the 
burden onto Lincoln University and its leadership. 
University officials and Missouri’s board of curators eventually responded to Gaines’ 
letters but did not give him a definite answer on his application.  In keeping with ignoring 
Gaines, Missouri officials kept changing from whom Gaines might receive an answer.  S.W. 
Canada wrote, “the member board Lincoln University [would] confer…about the matter.”72  
George C. Wilson—a member of the university board of curators who also received a letter from 
Gaines explaining his situation—stated that Gaines’ application “is handled in the first instance 
by the administrative officers…I suggest, therefore, that you take the matter up through these 
channels.”73  The NAACP and Gaines now received numerous suggestions as to how to go about 
inquiring about the status of Gaines’ application.  It became evident that unlike Donald Murray’s 
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situation in Maryland, Missouri officials were determined to employ evasive tactics and 
communication at every possible turn.  
Preparing for Court 
 With Gaines’ application held with no official decision, the NAACP contemplated 
potential legal options to alleviate the situation.  Houston and the local lawyers simply wanted to 
know if Gaines was to be admitted or not.  As explained before, Charles Houston wanted to 
know everything about his potential legal cases.  This all-encompassing caution and patience was 
a part of a more concerted strategy by Houston and the NAACP.  Suspecting legal challenges to 
begin immediately, the states often did not elaborate on the reasons behind the rejections since 
many did not receive applications from black students.  Relatedly, Houston “[was] not anxious” 
to rush the cases since he felt waiting and preparing “an air-tight case” would “[give] the state 
much more concern.”  Prolonging the waiting period and eliciting more elaboration by university 
officials would provide Houston with more legal ammunition in court.  With regard to Gaines, 
Houston relayed to Redmond that he wanted more students to apply to different graduate 
schools, more information regarding the available scholarships, and suggested that they may 
need to prepare for when Missouri might try to provide separate graduate education—a potential 
evolution from the Maryland case.74  With Houston’s background and experience, complete and 
total preparation was considered an absolute necessity to move forward with any legal action.  
The Gaines case was no exception.    
“A long, hard fight”—Filing Gaines v. Canada 
 On January 24, 1936—nine days after Maryland’s highest court of appeals affirmed the 
decision to issue a writ of mandamus admitting Donald Murray to the University of Maryland—
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Sidney Redmond and Charles Houston traveled to Columbia, Missouri to file suit against 
university registrar, S.W. Canada, on behalf of Lloyd Gaines.75  When they arrived Judge W.M. 
Dinwiddie appeared “surprised” and tried to direct them to the State Supreme Court as a suit in 
Columbia “would cause local resentment and make [the] community boil for awhile.”  Houston 
and Redmond pointed out that no matter what the outcome of the case, each side would appeal 
the decision.76  The two lawyers sought specific action with regard to Lloyd Gaines’ application 
to Missouri, which was languishing without a decision from the University of Missouri 
administrative officials.  Houston and Redmond made clear that the suit “[would] not affect the 
undergraduate colleges of the University of Missouri nor Lincoln University [because] it [was] 
directed at graduate and professional schools.”  In the petition, Houston and Redmond argued 
that there was no separate but equal educational system when there was only one segregated law 
school in the state.  The NAACP lawyers cited the recently won Murray v. Maryland case and 
the absence of a dramatic impact with the admittance of a black student as preliminary reasons 
why Gaines should be admitted.77  The NAACP wanted to ease fears of its more, guarded and 
wide-reaching goals by clearly articulating it only wanted to focus on graduate schools.  
After the initial petition for a writ of mandamus, Charles Houston began reaching out for 
support such as to the black press and white allies.  With only one plaintiff, the NAACP needed 
all the support in Missouri it could gather for the upcoming proceedings.  Throughout the fall of 
1935 and the early part of 1936, the NAACP discovered a few white students and faculty at 
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Missouri willing to foment sympathy and support.  Charlie Spencer, the most prominent student 
who communicated with Houston, wrote to Sidney Redmond after the mandamus suit was filed.  
Spencer informed Redmond that everyone was aware of Gaines’ pending legal suit and everyone 
at Missouri had developed an opinion—some “sympathetic, but more are openly hostile.”78  
Houston and the NAACP anticipated this would be the reality but the sympathy of some 
indicated their decision to begin in the Upper South was strategically sound.   
University of Missouri’s Preparations and Collusion 
 When Lloyd Gaines first applied to the University of Missouri, the Law School’s Dean—
William Masterson—prepared a memorandum on the admission of black students to the 
University of Missouri.  Masterson worked through the legality of excluding a student based on 
his race.  First, Masterson argued that “no official action ha[d] been taken excluding negroes 
from the University” despite the exclusion and denial being a tradition and a “matter of 
policy”—the excuse Donald Murray faced in Maryland.  Because of the lack of official 
legislation or rules, Masterson concluded plainly, “a negro is entitled of the right to be admitted 
to the School of Law.”  To answer the question as to whether or not excluding students based on 
their race violated the Fourteenth Amendment, Masterson bluntly wrote, “the answer is yes.”  
Masterson clearly viewed Missouri’s position as a violation of the law.  In the memorandum, he 
would offer his ideas to alleviate the potential legal trouble by suggesting Missouri give the 
Lincoln University Board of Curators more authority to establish new schools.  With such a 
change, Missouri—the university and the state government—would be in a much better position 
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than Maryland who limited the Princess Anne Academy’s powers.79  Masterson in his 
assessments was brutally honest to Missouri’s university administration.  Missouri needed to 
act—both legally and legislatively—to maintain its segregated tradition.  
From the outset, officials at Missouri knew they could be in potential legal trouble.  
President Frederick Middlebush forwarded this memorandum to a number of state senators early 
on to hopefully find a legislative solution to prevent any change to the current segregated system.  
W.S. Hogsett, Missouri’s counsel, and President Middlebush recognized that preparing more 
options than simply hoping to win their legal case was critical.  The intrastate correspondence 
show that these thoughts were on the mind of the major people involved in the Gaines and 
Bluford cases. 
 Relatedly, the University of Missouri Papers indicate a clear collusion between university 
officials, state senators, and the presiding judge, W.S. Dinwiddie.  In letters written to various 
state senators, President Middlebush indicated that the university tapped Nick Cave—a State 
Senator and attorney from Columbia—to be one of its counselors.  Middlebush spoke with 
Senator Cave who “agreed informally to discuss this matter with Judge Dinwiddie and see to it 
that the University’s interests are protected at every point.”80  The collusion of university 
officials and Judge Dinwiddie did not shock Sidney Redmond who believed that “[Judge 
Dinwiddie was] working with the officials of the University of Missouri.”81  To some degree, the 
NAACP’s case in Columbia—both for Gaines and Bluford—was doomed from the start due to 
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this collusion between the University of Missouri, the legislature, and the courts.  The collusion 
also demonstrated how much was stacked against any potential NAACP plaintiff and case. 
 Expanding the scope of the situation to outside of Missouri, President Frederick 
Middlebush started a chain of correspondence between other leaders at Upper South state 
universities such as Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland.  Having just 
lost to the NAACP, Maryland’s Dean, Roger Howell, was “only to happy to talk with 
[Middlebush] about this problem” of black students applying to segregated universities.82  This 
collaboration shows the evolution of responses by the Upper South state universities was not 
disjointed but rather seamless and conscientious.  Therefore, when understanding how the 
NAACP’s legal campaign progressed, it is critical to make strong links between individual legal 
cases in order to see how universities responded and adapted to each legal case across the 
country. 
The First Denial and Filing of the Second Writ of Mandamus 
While the first mandamus proceeding was pending, the Missouri Board of Curators 
rejected Gaines’ application on March 27, 1936.  The action taken by the board effectively 
voided the first mandamus suit, which asked for a decision on Gaines’ application.  The 
University of Missouri now had officially denied Gaines.  Compelled by the deliberate action of 
the board of curators, Houston moved quickly in order to file for another writ of mandamus 
asking for Lloyd Gaines to be admitted immediately to Missouri.  Houston saw Missouri’s denial 
as a violation of failing to provide equal opportunity in education despite the university’s 
contention that the scholarship program satisfied that requirement.  Houston specified “the issue 
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[was] now squarely on the race question” but instructed the St. Louis lawyers to not mention race 
and wait for an answer, which would confirm their suspicions.83  Following instructions, 
Redmond and Espy filed a mandamus suit on April 15, 1936 in Boone County Circuit Court 
seeking to immediately admit Gaines into the University of Missouri Law School.   
In a response to the petition for the writ of mandamus, the University of Missouri lawyers 
argued interestingly that Lloyd Gaines was not a taxpayer since he had no substantial income or 
property.  The Missouri lawyers argued as well that Gaines was not academically qualified for 
admission to Missouri’s Law School because Lincoln University was not an accredited 
university in the view of Missouri’s administration.  The University of Missouri’s counsel—led 
by W.S. Hogsett of Kansas City—put forth a complete denial explaining that any claims put 
forth by Lloyd Gaines and his counsel were not true or the arguments that Missouri based its 
case on were not illegal.  Missouri’s lawyers also depended on the state constitution and the out-
of-state scholarships—available to black students seeking graduate training in adjacent states—to 
justify its position. The arguments were surprising because some of them essentially validated 
the NAACP’s argument that Lincoln University was unequal to that of the University of 
Missouri and Lincoln University was incapable of providing such an equal graduate education to 
black students.  The contentions made by Missouri’s counsel are puzzling today but were 
strategic and pragmatic at the time since the realistic burden rested on Gaines and the NAACP to 
prove their claims.    
Gaines’ First Deposition 
Prior to the first Gaines trial, W.S. Hogsett took Lloyd Gaines’ deposition to prepare 
Missouri’s central arguments.  The deposition indicated Hogsett planned to present his 
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arguments in dramatic fashion and was aware of the NAACP’s nationwide campaign.  Primarily, 
W.S. Hogsett worked hard to get Lloyd Gaines to admit to having the NAACP orchestrate his 
legal case.  Hogsett wanted Gaines to admit that he was being used to try to integrate the 
University of Missouri and did not actually desire to attend graduate school.  Gaines held firm, 
stating that the legal case was his idea and that he had limited knowledge of the other legal cases 
taking place across the country.  Hogsett pointed out that Gaines did not list Lincoln University 
in his application—an important point as Lincoln University was not listed as one of the 53 
accredited universities accepted by Missouri university officials.  By using this point, Hogsett 
suggested that Gaines knew that he was to be denied but applied anyway because he was a 
NAACP pawn in its campaign for educational equality.    
Throughout the deposition, Hogsett intensely questioned Gaines and led him through the 
process Missouri’s lawyers and administration thought Gaines was supposed to take: apply at 
Lincoln University, ask for law education, and to understand the University of Missouri was an 
all-white institution and would never accept black students.  Gaines, under intense pressure, was 
steadfast with his insistence that he applied to Missouri’s Law School because he wanted to 
study law in the state of Missouri and that the only option for law training through Lincoln 
University was an out-of-state scholarship.84  The deposition is surprising considering much of 
what Hogsett was trying to draw out of Gaines would not be used until the Lucile Bluford 
proceedings in the years following.  Not using the conspiracy arguments also points to the 
conclusion that Gaines’ intentions were pure enough that the defense chose not utilize the 
argument in the proceedings.  Hogsett centered his arguments on the scholarship provisions 
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available at Lincoln University and other points of qualification not the NAACP conspiracy and 
Gaines’ supposed bad faith in applying to Missouri’s Law School.   
The First Gaines Court Proceedings 
In Columbia, Missouri on July 10, 1936, first proceedings in Gaines v. Canada took 
place in a courtroom that was “quite cordial and informal.”  The half-filled courtroom would 
eventually fill up with summer school students, farmers seeking aid from other agencies in the 
courthouse, and local black citizens.85  The defense—led by the dramatic W.S. Hogsett—
contended that Gaines did not have any “standing in court because he had not first demanded that 
Lincoln University establish a law school…[and that] the state scholarships provided for Negro 
students to study outside the state furnished equal protection of the law agreeable to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”86  The Missouri counselors wanted to have it many ways and their 
arguments were contradictory.  Hogsett argued that Gaines was not academically qualified for 
admission to the University of Missouri because Lincoln University was not considered an 
accredited university.  This argument made inequality an issue in the proceedings.  Additionally, 
Hogsett argued that it was Lincoln University’s job to create a law school for Gaines.  Houston 
wondered how an unaccredited university could create a graduate school equal to that at 
Missouri.  These arguments did not make up the bulk of the NAACP’s case but they do 
demonstrate that Missouri was playing with fire.  
Relatedly, Houston and Redmond demonstrated that Lincoln University did not have 
adequate funds to furnish a law school for Gaines and even if Lincoln did have the funding “it 
would be foolish to try to start a law school” because of the limited demand.  The two lawyers 
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also cross-examined E.R. Adams, the Assistant State Superintendent of Education.  Houston 
extracted from Adams a confession that scholarship programs, which the defense based much of 
its case on, had been modified to only provide the difference in out-of-state tuition rather than 
paying all of the tuition for black students.  S.W. Canada—the primary defendant—also admitted 
that the University of Missouri did admit students of different races from foreign countries.87  
Houston and Redmond established that Missouri did not give Lincoln University enough funding 
to establish a law school; the establishment of the law school would be fiscally irresponsible; the 
scholarship program, which Hogsett understood as satisfying the demands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, was underfunded and a sham; and the University of Missouri had no difficulty 
admitting students of different races and countries into their various programs—just not black 
students.  All of these concessions and established facts led Houston to argue not admitting 
Gaines was not only unfair but also indicative of a system that was inherently evasive and 
unequal under the fourteenth amendment. 
The judge—admittedly against the NAACP—wanted answers to two questions: did the 
1921 state constitution establishing Lincoln University as a state university constitute a law to 
exclude blacks from the University of Missouri?  And did the scholarship program offered equal 
protection under the fourteenth amendment?  Together these questions point to the central issue 
as to whether or not financial aid in the form of out-of-states scholarships represented equal 
treatment under the law in Missouri.   
 A few months later on July 27, 1936, Judge Dinwiddie handed down his decision in favor 
of Missouri and its counsel’s arguments, citing their soundness.  In response, Redmond worried 
that an appeal to the State Supreme Court could take up to two years, robbing Gaines of valuable 
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time and education.  In response to the decision and Redmond’s concern, the NAACP filed an 
appeal and worked with the university officials “requesting the court to advance the Gaines case 
on the docket.”88  This way the case could be heard much sooner than normal.   
In the interim, Lloyd Gaines planned to attend the University of Michigan and work on a 
Masters in Economics.  Finding help from the NAACP central office, Houston worked to find 
funds for Gaines’ tuition.  Houston fretted about Gaines’ academic standing and finances since 
the possibility of Gaines dropping out of school would dramatically hurt his Missouri case since 
Missouri’s lawyers could then argue that Gaines was not prepared for graduate school and did 
not need to be admitted.  Houston cautioned Gaines to be aware of his academic abilities and 
instructed him to speak with the dean if he had difficulties.89  Beyond the prospects of the legal 
case, Houston attempted to groom Gaines to be prepared to excite crowds and inspire others, 
especially students and young people.  In one letter, Houston gave advice to work on writing and 
speaking with “clarity and simplicity.”  Gaines would need to improve these areas, Houston 
suggested, because “as a public speaker that is what [Gaines would] need.”90  Houston saw the 
plaintiffs he supported not just as vessels to transform legal education but also as race leaders 
who could inspire and excite others to follow in their path.  These concerns punctuate that the 
legal strategy was of central importance to the campaign but presentation and engaging the 
public were major considerations of Houston and the NAACP given the fact that cases like 
Gaines and Murray were not as exciting as other national trials.  
Preparing for the State Supreme Court 
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 Though the Gaines case was fast-tracked onto the State Supreme Court docket, the 
NAACP had months to prepare its case and weigh the significance against the legal cases that 
had and were occurring in Maryland and Tennessee.  Houston saw the Gaines case in Missouri 
as the best option to bring the NAACP’s argument before the United States Supreme Court.  The 
legal challenges and issues that arose in Tennessee and Maryland, according to Houston, were 
“walkovers compared to the problems raised in this Missouri case.”91  Wading through the 
Missouri-specific problems, Houston and Redmond discussed rechecking all prior cases regard 
segregation in Missouri education, finding out the legislature’s attitude, and revisiting their 
understanding of the scholarship program.  Houston believed the NAACP would center its 
arguments on the contention that Gaines should be admitted to Missouri’s Law School, not that 
Missouri should provide law education at Lincoln University.  Houston wanted the state to take 
them down that side route if it desired but Houston wanted to stick to one goal—admitting 
Gaines into the University of Missouri. 
 Meanwhile in Michigan, Gaines did not disappoint Houston, receiving a “B” average and 
re-paying his tuition loan set up by Houston and the NAACP.  With graduation potentially 
approaching in the summer and the fall of 1937, Gaines reassessed his finances and reached out 
to Walter White for potential employment.92  The attempt was not fruitful for Gaines, though he 
indicated he received some type of employment.  The letter from Gaines to White was indicative 
of his trouble finding employment and stability.  Connected to one of the more powerful men in 
the national black community, Gaines—the most prominent NAACP plaintiff—only received a 
tuition loan.   
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The State Supreme Court Trial 
 The Missouri State Supreme Court heard arguments from Missouri’s counsel and the 
NAACP with regards to the potential admission of Lloyd Gaines on May 21, 1937.  Many of the 
same arguments dominated the proceedings.  W.S. Hogsett, Missouri’s main counselor, inserted 
the contention that appropriations to Lincoln University and the out-of-state scholarships were 
the equivalent of social equality—what a NAACP press release called “Old Bugaboo of ‘Social 
Equality.’”  The NAACP again demonstrated that Lincoln had not received an increase in 
appropriations since the amendments to the 1921 state constitution.  The trial was uneventful and 
mostly consisted of slightly altered arguments of the prior proceedings.  The somewhat tedious 
and procedural trials exhibited in the Gaines and Murray cases demonstrated the path to equal 
opportunity would be tiresome and unexciting.  The court decided against the NAACP on 
December 10, 1937 upholding the bar on Lloyd Gaines entering Missouri’s Law School.  The 
NAACP now had a case that could be appealed to the United States Supreme Court—giving the 
NAACP the opportunity to obtain a nationwide precedent.  
 After the decision, Hogsett moved to have university officials covertly lobby for new 
appropriations for Lincoln University in the legislature.  Hogsett felt that if the case reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Missouri and the university stood little chance of winning and needed to 
prepare for a legislative remedy and a second hearing in the State Supreme Court.93  Hogsett’s 
line of reasoning followed previous official University of Missouri correspondence, which 
indicated that many of the university officials knew that Missouri was in potential legal trouble.  
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With these actions and the court cases, Missouri officials were simply biding time before the 
university integrated or the legislature appropriated a good sum of money to Lincoln University. 
Building Community Support and Reaching Out for More Plaintiffs 
 Charles Houston and the NAACP spent much of their time and efforts defining their 
battles and preparing for the detailed court cases of the few plaintiffs they represented.  As 
Gaines v. Canada weaved its way through the court system, momentum was building in local 
Missouri communities and across the nation.  Houston wanted to capitalize on the notoriety and 
use it to propel the campaign for educational equality forward.  Before the Missouri State 
Supreme Court hearings, Houston suggested the first mass meeting take place in Kansas City to 
raise support and funds for the efforts—a strategy utilized consistently throughout the following 
Bluford v. Canada court cases.  After the State Supreme Court handed down its decision against 
Gaines, Houston also ramped up his efforts reaching out to fraternities and sororities in an 
attempt to attract new plaintiffs.  If Gaines and the NAACP faltered, Houston needed other 
plaintiffs in reserve to not waste time and continue the campaign without interruption.  Exciting 
local black communities and enticing more students to join the cause proved difficult at first for 
the NAACP.  However with the potential for victory in the Gaines case, Charles Houston wanted 
and needed to succeed in utilizing the growing support in the black community with a pulse for 
the NAACP’s efforts thus far. 
United States Supreme Court—Preparation, Execution, and the Decision 
 On May 24, 1938, the NAACP filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court.  With this development in the Gaines case, funding became more available from various 
sources including the Garland Fund and national fraternities.  Charles Houston and Sidney 
Redmond calmed by the influx of funds, now just had to prepare for what would become the 
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monumental civil rights court case of the 1930s.  To prepare, Houston reached out to one of the 
originators of the NAACP’s coordinated legal strategy, Nathan Margold, for help and for 
suggestions, in addition to other prominent lawyers.  This type of correspondence was 
unprecedented for Houston who unlike his protégé Thurgood Marshall, did not enlist much help 
outside of his own personal and professional circle. 
 Complicating the preparations, in July 1938, Gaines was thought to be missing by his 
family, who told the NAACP, “[he] was kidnapped.”94  Though the assumption turned out to be 
unfounded, the concern raised by his family followed a pattern of instances in which Gaines 
went long periods of time without staying in contact with those closest to him.  In personal 
correspondence, Gaines’ family consistently noted that Gaines was not good about sending 
letters home when he was off at school.  Also, Sidney Redmond noted early in his efforts that 
Gaines disappeared and did not tell him where he was going or when he would return.  The 
occurrences seem to not have been isolated instances but rather consistent and representative of 
Lloyd Gaines’ personality.  
 On October 14, 1938, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to Lloyd 
Gaines, which enabled the court to review Gaines v. Canada.  The court date was set for 
November 7, 1938.  Receiving the news, Roy Wilkins, the assistant NAACP secretary, sent out a 
notice to seven black newspapers across the country in hopes to raise awareness and increase 
press coverage.95  Walter White pressed the Garland Fund, which had slowed funding to a trickle 
throughout the early proceedings, for more financing since the NAACP finally arrived a situation 
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where setting a national precedent was possible.96  Charles Houston in addition to Wilkins 
contacted the prominent black newspapers and urged them to publish calls for students to come 
forward who had been denied out-of-state scholarships.  Houston sought more evidence that the 
scholarship programs—being created across the Upper South and the centerpiece of Missouri’s 
argument—shirked their responsibility to provide education to black students.  To do this, 
Houston needed to tap into the strong network of support throughout the nationwide black 
community to build his argument and find real-life examples to use in court.  With actions like 
this, the NAACP slowly built lasting avenues to move its campaign for educational equality 
forward beyond the arenas of the courtroom and legal circles. 
“Victory in the Missouri U. Case” 
 A month after the hearing, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion on 
December 12, 1938 in favor of the plaintiff—Lloyd Lionel Gaines and the NAACP.  The opinion 
presented the wide array analyses on the presented arguments such as the legality of Missouri’s 
policies segregating education despite explicit state laws, the issue of Lloyd Gaines’ Missouri 
citizenship and taxpayer status, and whether or not the scholarship program could be considered 
equal protection under the law. The court commended Missouri as “a pioneer” since it was “the 
only State in the Union which has established a separate university for negroes on the same basis 
as the state university for white students.”97  Nevertheless, the court bluntly admitted that there 
was no provision of legal education for black students anywhere in the state.  
 Answering Missouri’s argument that Lincoln University possessed the authority to 
establish a law school, the court declared, “that a mere declaration of purpose, still unfulfilled, 
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[was not] enough.”  The court also interpreted the prior proceedings—including the defense’s 
arguments—as reliant on the discretion of the Lincoln Board of Curators, who was tasked with 
deciding whether it was necessary to build a law school or continue to send black students out of 
the state.  The prior proceedings created a confusion of where the burden to provide education 
was to be placed and how that education was to be provided.  Given Missouri’s insistence on the 
legality of the scholarship program, the court focused on the question as to whether or not 
Missouri had to provide legal education within in the state, which became “the pivot upon which 
this case turn[ed].”98  The court threw out many of the arguments such as the distance to out-of-
state universities, tuition concerns, and Gaines’ contention that the Missouri Law School 
specialized in Missouri law.  The court was mainly interested in whether or not Missouri 
furnished the same opportunities for both white and black students.  
 The Supreme Court found that the system present in Missouri was “a denial of the 
equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and the 
provision for the payment of tuition fees in another state does not remove this discrimination.”99  
Missouri, according to the decision, was not required to provide legal education but if it did 
provide legal training it needed to provide the opportunity to all citizens regardless of race.  
However within this declaration, the court did not declare the dual system of education 
inherently unconstitutional.  The justices believed that the scholarship program should have been 
viewed as a temporary solution until separate graduate schools such as the law school were 
established.  This caveat would complicate the future proceedings in Missouri and around the 
country.  It also signaled that the NAACP did not possess the capital or legal groundwork, at the 
time, to entirely invalidate Plessy v. Ferguson at one time.  The NAACP anticipated and now 
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recognized that there would be multiple steps to realizing equal protection and opportunity under 
the law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision transformed the legal landscape.  It also handed the 
NAACP a hard-fought, nationwide precedent with which to attack other state universities as they 
attempted to quickly mimic the stall tactics taken by the University of Missouri.             
Reactions to the Precedent 
 Following the court’s decision, reactions ran the gamut of emotions and thoughts.  The 
black press’s reaction despite the outreach by the NAACP was more or less muted with only 
flashes of optimism.  The case had not been that exciting compared to trials such as the 
Scottsboro Boys and was a reminder of the “hard [and] tedious work” needed to “realize equal 
opportunity.”100  The decision’s limited impact on the Jim Crow system also drove the “moderate 
elation” and prompted a “cautioning…against unfounded optimism.”101  Locally in Missouri, the 
court’s decision was heralded as a great success in both The Kansas City Call and The St. Louis 
American.  However, the reserved reaction to Gaines decision was, perhaps, due to limited civil 
rights victories in the 1930s, leftover pessimism caused by the Great Depression, and the lack of 
drama and excitement exhibited in other civil rights legal cases. 
 As expected, University of Missouri officials and the state of Missouri were mum on the 
decision.  President Middlebush prepared a brief statement—“ No Statement to Make”—when 
requested by The St. Louis Call.102  Much of the university’s efforts now centered on the 
upcoming appeal and how the state would respond to the demand for graduate education “within 
the state.”  As he had done in the past, Middlebush alerted other Upper South state universities—
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Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia—as to what the Gaines 
decision meant to them. The Upper South universities kept a watch on the proceedings in 
Missouri, as they knew the NAACP had attempted cases in other states such as Maryland, 
Virginia, and Tennessee though with limited success compared to the Gaines efforts.  Now, the 
NAACP had experienced a great level of success and started to break down the barriers to equal 
protection in education through the federal courts. 
Differences between Murray v. Maryland and Gaines v. Canada 
 The NAACP’s legal case in Maryland brought on behalf of Donald Gaines Murray 
occurred prior to, and also alongside, the Lloyd Gaines efforts in Missouri.  As explained before, 
Donald Gaines Murray was the first victory of the campaign for educational equality.  A state 
judge ordered the University of Maryland to admit Murray to its law school after Maryland 
failed to provide an opportunity for law education to its black citizens.  Despite the obvious 
similarities of the victories, the Murray and Gaines cases differed greatly, especially with regard 
to what difficulties with which the NAACP had to contend. 
 First, the University of Maryland “excluded black students as a matter of policy” but 
there were no “laws or rules mandating that the college be segregated.”103  In contrast, 
segregation was written into Missouri’s 1865 State Constitution and there were numerous laws 
that followed which reaffirmed segregated education.104  The difference set the bar much higher 
in Missouri as Houston and the NAACP needed to argue against established law in addition to 
matters of policy.  Whereas in Maryland, NAACP had to prove there was no legal precedent 
either for or against “separate but equal” education. 
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Second, a state court decided on Murray v. Maryland, thus making the transferability of 
the court’s decision to other states nearly impossible.  Aside from the fact that Murray was the 
first black admitted and enrolled at a state university graduate school because of a NAACP-led 
effort, the Gaines case held more weight because it reached the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
NAACP won.  The U.S. Supreme Court armed the NAACP with a precedent that could press 
state universities and legislatures throughout the south to integrate even though the court 
effectively upheld the validity of Plessy v. Ferguson.  Now, the NAACP hoped state universities 
and legislatures did not want to spend the time and resources to establish separate universities for 
black students.  The willingness of Missouri to established separate schools complicated the 
strategy and signaled an evolution on both sides of the debate from Murray v. Maryland to the 
Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford cases. 
 Third, the NAACP coordinated Lloyd Gaines’s attempt at admission and subsequent 
legal case whereas Donald Gaines Murray’s legal case involved multiple organizations and 
leaders.  As explained, Houston and Thurgood Marshall co-opted Murray’s case from the 
fraternity Alpha Phi Alpha.  Albeit successful, the takeover strained the relationship between the 
fraternity and the NAACP, which was a beneficiary of such successful relationships.105  The 
source, execution, and aftermath of the Murray case is significant because it demonstrates that 
Gaines v. Canada was, in fact, the first independent NAACP legal success in the campaign for 
educational equality.  
 Lastly, Gaines v. Canada spurred a legislative response that allocated funds to establish 
the separate schools and shifted the burden onto Lincoln University, which will be explained in 
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Chapter 2 and 3.106  Murray v. Maryland simply granted Murray admission to University of 
Maryland and the legislature did not respond quick enough to thwart Murray’s enrollment and 
eventual graduation.  Maryland’s response, or lack of response, made the Murray case very 
simple.  Missouri’s response to Gaines complicated matters and demonstrated the first adaptation 
by a state university and legislature to the NAACP’s success and strategies. 
Lloyd Gaines Disappears 
 Three months after his U.S. Supreme Court victory on February 26, 1939, Lloyd Gaines 
gave an inspiring speech to an overflowing crowd at Centennial M.E. Church in Kansas City, 
Missouri.  Gaines encouraged those in attendance to join the NAACP and to continue the fight 
for their rights.  He also answered his critics reaffirming his desire to study law at the University 
of Missouri.107  After the speech, Lucile Bluford drove Lloyd Gaines to Union Station in Kansas 
City where he boarded a train bound for Chicago.  This would be the first and only time Bluford 
and Gaines would meet.108  Once Gaines arrived in Chicago, he stayed with his fraternity 
brothers at their fraternity house.  He intended to try and find employment, something that was 
becoming increasingly difficult for Gaines despite his national notoriety.  During the past few 
years, Gaines floated from Lincoln University back to St. Louis and then to the University of 
Michigan.  Everywhere he stayed Gaines sought out employment opportunities but was never 
able to find the stability he desired.  And now in Chicago, Gaines seemed unsure where 
circumstance would lead him next. 
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 Gaines wrote a few final letters to his mother and some friends discussing his concerns, 
difficulties, and the stresses revolving around legal case and national popularity.  In the last letter 
to his mother dated March 3, 1939, Gaines wrote a haunting and foreshadowing message: 
Dear Mother: I have come to Chicago hoping to make my own 
way…I asked some of my “friends” in a position to do so to be on 
the lookout for another job for me long before I quit [the job at the 
gas station]…As for my publicity relative to the university case, I 
have found that my race still likes to applaude, shake hands, pat me 
on the back and say how great and noble is the idea; how historical 
and socially important the case[.] But – there it ends…I am just a 
man—not one who has fought and sacrificed to make the case 
possible; one who is still fighting and sacrificing – almost the 
“supreme sacrifice” to see that it is a complete and lasting success 
for thirteen million Negroes—no! no just another man.  Sometimes 
I wish I were just a plain, ordinary man whose name no one 
recognized…[In Chicago] so far I haven’t been able to dig up a 
single job prospect, but I am still trying.  Paid up my room rent 
until March 7th.  If nothing turns up by then, I’ll have to make 
other arrangements.  Should I forget to write for a time don’t worry 
about it, I can look over myself ok. As ever, Lloyd.109   
 This last letter to his mother, Callie, reveals a great deal about his fate, though nothing 
can be substantiated.  The lack of financial stability and the inability to find a job clearly 
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frustrated Gaines and he made them a top priority in his limited correspondence.  Furthermore, 
Gaines felt that others for whom he was fighting did not appreciate his sacrifice, which he 
believed could ultimately be his life.  The letter also set a deadline as to when Gaines, perhaps, 
needed to move on from his living situation in Chicago. 
 Charles Houston noted that Gaines’ last known correspondence with anyone was in April 
1939.  After this correspondence, the NAACP and Gaines’s family and friends lost track of him.  
At first, Houston and Sidney Redmond did not stress about the inability to contact Gaines.  
However, as the summer ended, Houston and Redmond became more inclined to find Gaines to 
apply to Missouri again and be present in upcoming court proceedings.  It was also at the end of 
the summer of 1939 that the Lincoln University Law School was finalized and established at 
Poro College—a beauty college—in St. Louis.  Gaines was supposed to enroll in the Lincoln 
Law School or join the NAACP again to argue the unequal nature of the Lincoln Law School.     
  Thus the end of the summer of 1939 presented the NAACP a complex collision of 
factors.  Gaines had yet to be contacted.  The NAACP felt it could continue for some time 
without him.  The state of Missouri hastily gave Lincoln University “a beggarly $200,000” to 
establish a law school, which the NAACP argued was inherently unequal to Missouri’s law 
school.110  Additionally, Lucile Bluford—who applied in January 1939 to the University of 
Missouri and was denied—and the NAACP were in the process of building another legal case for 
admission to Missouri’s graduate School of Journalism, which also lacked a counterpart at 
Lincoln University.  Examining the correspondence between the various officials, one can 
understand how the complexities of the year 1939 presented hindrances but also new 
opportunities to push the state of Missouri on their interpretation of “separate but equal.” 
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 When Lloyd Gaines did not appear before the Missouri Supreme Court, his 
disappearance was apparent and the defense pounced.  The NAACP was forced to admit that it 
had not been able to contact Gaines for months.  It was also the first time the public became 
aware of Gaines’ disappearance.  Continually, The Call and others in the black press led a 
nation-wide campaign to find Lloyd Gaines. Headlines such as “Where is Lloyd Gaines—Have 
You Seen Him?” appeared in The Call.111  Rumors circulated about Gaines’ whereabouts.  Some 
speculated that he was in Michigan; others thought he had been killed or bought off so he would 
disappear.  The most distant guess was Mexico.   
 Much of the debate about Gaines’ fate centered on whether he was alive or not.  Some 
thought that Gaines’ family knew he was alive but did not alert authorities.  One of those people 
was Lucile Bluford.  In later years, Bluford would regularly visit the Gaines family in St. Louis.  
Holding the suspicion that the family had been in contact with Gaines, Bluford—after numerous 
visits—slowly began to become “convinced that his folks didn’t know what happened to him.”112  
Understood in the context of Gaines’ background, there are obvious signs as to why 
Gaines may have disappeared on his own accord.  Throughout his entire life, Gaines had not 
been financially stable or even comfortable.  Gaines worked throughout his childhood and 
college and even with the new fame he still had difficulty finding work.  It is also known that 
Gaines disappeared at times without contacting his family or the NAACP.  In a way, Gaines 
appeared to be a wanderer and comfortable with being out of contact for long periods of time.  
These continuous clues appeared throughout Gaines’ life and lead one to conclude that Gaines 
may have disappeared willingly in order to find a more stable life—something Gaines always 
desired.   
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Conclusion 
 Lloyd Gaines, in the context of future plaintiffs, was prototypical.  Gaines was a 
successful student who exhibited the characteristics valued by the broader American public.  
This is the understanding most have of Lloyd Gaines.  But underneath the prototypical nature of 
Gaines’ background lies details that paint a fuller picture of him as a person and a plaintiff.   
 Having always struggled with finances and limitations, Gaines to a certain extent 
considered himself exceptional but also spurned.  He had a difficult time dealing with the 
limitations of his opportunities despite his work ethic and intelligence.  One can see this dual 
nature that characterized Gaines throughout the legal case.  Gaines sought the best and most 
excellent opportunities but encountered some of the most devastating limitations.  These 
limitations would ultimately lead to his disappearance and the undoing of his legal case.     
 In legal terms, Gaines v. Canada was truly unsettled, as S.W. Canada would explain to 
Lucile Bluford in January 1939.  A nationwide precedent had been set but the practical 
application of the precedent in Missouri never became a reality due Gaines’ mysterious 
disappearance.  Unlike Donald Murray, Lloyd Gaines never realized the fruits of his sacrifice but 
greatly affected the future of the campaign for educational equality.  
 The Gaines v. Canada precedent broke down one barrier to integration—the evasion by 
states sending black students out of the state to receive education.  The future path to integration 
would prove difficult but the experience in Missouri and the collusion of the Upper South state 
universities set the stage for a logical progression and similar arguments.  The NAACP would 
hear new variations of the arguments established in the Gaines case in future legal cases in 
Oklahoma, Texas, and most notably in the next Missouri case brought by Lucile Bluford.  The 
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Gaines case thus broke ground on the nationwide campaign and gave the NAACP hope that it 
could move forward in other states successfully. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court victory, the appeal by Missouri, and the eventual dropping of 
the case by the NAACP complicated the practical impact of Gaines v. Canada in Missouri.  The 
NAACP held in its hands an untested and critical precedent with a missing plaintiff.  
Additionally, Missouri strategized to satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court by giving Lincoln 
University expanded powers to establish a law school and control its own affairs.  Thus while the 
court’s decision was transformative and significant it still gave states such as Missouri the 
opportunity to continue segregated graduate and professional education.  Similar to the 
development of the legal strategy by Charles Houston some of the first few results were just as 
muddled and complicated but key to pragmatically and systematically breaking down the Plessy 
v. Ferguson precedent in education.  The development of Gaines’ narrative and the legal case 
serves to highlight the early evolution of the NAACP’s legal strategy and the impact it had on 
Lucile Bluford’s case in Missouri.  
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Chapter 2 
Testing the Precedent: Bluford v. Canada 
In 2002, a year before her passing, Lucile Bluford was named Kansas Citian of the Year.  
The honor was an endnote to a full life that included an influential career as a journalist, 
numerous civic leadership positions, and a pervasive influence throughout Kansas City.  Despite 
the long list of accolades, Bluford occupies a unique place in civil rights history.  Consistently, 
historical civil rights plaintiffs’ legacies have focused primarily on their legal cases and their 
civil rights activism that followed.  However to Bluford and others, her attempt to integrate the 
University of Missouri’s School of Journalism in the late 1930s and early 1940s became an 
afterthought.  Bluford’s tremendous success and influence after her legal case, her reluctance to 
highlight the history, and the limited success of the case are partly to blame for the near-
complete absence of any substantial scholarship.  Despite this, the significance of Bluford’s legal 
case and her historical narrative still remain integral to the broader histories of the period and 
need to be explored further.   
The 1938 Gaines v. Canada decision cleared the path for the NAACP in the campaign for 
educational equality and it needed to act quickly to test the precedent at the University of 
Missouri.  Despite constant networking among local NAACP branches and fraternity networks, it 
was difficult for the NAACP to recruit potential plaintiffs to attempt enrolling at white state 
universities.  Ideally given that the Gaines decision mandated the provision of higher education 
within Missouri’s borders, the NAACP preferred to find a suitable candidate in Missouri to assist 
Gaines in integrating the University of Missouri.  Lucile Bluford—possessing a curiosity and an 
excellent academic and professional resume—became that candidate.  
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To best understand and demonstrate the significance of Lucile Bluford’s legal challenge, 
this chapter develops a more complete narrative of both her early life and her legal case.  Lucile 
Bluford’s life leading up to the legal case against the University of Missouri is critical in 
understanding Bluford and the overall trajectory of the legal case.  Often glossed over, Bluford’s 
early life and its significance are not fully recognized.  The narrative of her early life builds the 
pillars of the legal case: a strong connection to and upbringing around the NAACP, excellence 
and experience in journalism, and an inclination to test injustices and challenge the status quo. 
Bluford’s upbringing and experiences as a youth and young adult led directly into 
involvement with the NAACP and her legal challenge.  I will develop a more detailed and 
complete narrative of Bluford and the NAACP’s attempt to test the Gaines precedent.  This 
narrative will weave together the underlying themes of Bluford’s earlier life and demonstrate 
points where the Bluford and Gaines narratives overlap.  These overlaps, connections, and the 
related significances will be further explored in the third chapter.  This chapter will also address 
in more specific terms how Bluford and the NAACP initiated the legal case, the evasion by 
Missouri to avoid integration, and the theatrics of the court proceedings among other unexplored 
intricacies.   
After the Gaines decision, Bluford and the NAACP did not need to prove that graduate 
education had to be provided “within the state” but rather Bluford would test Missouri’s 
adherence to the decision and question the quality of the proposed plans.  Though Bluford and 
the NAACP did not ultimate achieve success, their efforts furthered the NAACP legal strategy 
and campaign as Charles Houston and the NAACP learned from both the Gaines and Bluford 
cases.  He and the NAACP would apply these critical lessons and seasoned arguments to future 
test cases in the campaign for educational equality.  
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Early Life  
Lucile Harris Bluford was born on July 11, 1911 in Salisbury, North Carolina.  Her 
parents were John Henry Bluford—a graduate of Howard University and Cornell, and a 
professor of agriculture at North Carolina A&M in Greensboro, North Carolina—and Viola 
Harris Bluford—a graduate of Oberlin College in Ohio.113  Despite being born in Salisbury, the 
Bluford family lived in Greensboro about fifty miles away.  At the young age of four, Bluford’s 
mother passed away and the children were divided amongst family and friends while John 
Bluford settled affairs and continued his work in Greensboro.  When her family separated, Lucile 
Bluford returned to Salisbury to stay with her maternal grandmother, Mariah Harris.  Bluford 
adored her grandmother and believed that Harris “taught her everything [she] knew”.114  It was 
often remarked that Bluford “was [her] grandmother’s child.”115  
Around two years after the passing of Viola Harris Bluford, John Bluford remarried to 
Addie Alston and moved to Kansas City with Bluford’s two brothers John Jr. and Guion.  John 
Bluford had accepted a position as a science teacher at the segregated, black high school Lincoln 
High, which served the Missouri side of the state line.  Young Lucile Bluford chose to stay with 
her grandmother instead of moving to Kansas City.  Here, Bluford stayed in Salisbury until age 
ten when her grandmother passed as well.116  Rejoining the family in Kansas City, Bluford 
became immersed in a civic-orientated, middle-class culture influenced by her father.   
Bluford described her father as quiet and not necessarily outspoken on many topics.  
However, Bluford did express that “[her father] was interested in the NAACP [National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People]” and that his interest rubbed off on Bluford 
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who became a youth member and attended numerous summer conventions with her father.117  
Growing up, Bluford heard speeches in Kansas City from national NAACP leaders such as 
Walter White.118  Bluford remembered attending local branch meetings and the topics discussed 
there became mainstays in the Bluford household.  The NAACP affected Bluford’s tremendously 
at a young age and this influence and involvement continued throughout her life.    
As a part of the Lincoln High School faculty, John Bluford and his family entered into a 
unique group of black Kansas Citians.  Lincoln High School had a reputation of hiring the best 
faculty from all over the country and John Bluford being from North Carolina and a college 
professor exemplified these hiring practices.  The Bluford family’s living situation and the 
history behind the area demonstrated this elevated, middle-class status in the black community.  
Bluford imparted a story where she explained that the principal of Lincoln—H. O. Cook—was 
extremely light-skinned and could pass for white.119  When Cook moved to Kansas City, he 
bought a house from an unknowing white family in a white neighborhood.  When Cook brought 
his darker complexioned wife to their new house, the white family who had sold the house 
“didn’t know what they had done.”120  The white families in the neighborhood eventually ceded 
the two-block area around Cook’s home to middle class black families, such as the Blufords and 
other Lincoln faculty.  Bluford typified the model combination of education, civic involvement, 
and a middle-class standing, which the NAACP found easiest to tap into for support. 
Finding the Journalist Passion  
 Joining her father at Lincoln High School in 1924, Lucile Bluford made her mark quickly 
in what would be an illustrious high school career.  As a freshman, Bluford took advantage of the 
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numerous opportunities offered at Lincoln, in particular writing and journalism.  Bluford and 
others in Miss Buchanan’s freshman class organized a monthly newspaper, The Observer, which 
was separate from the larger school newspaper The Lincolnite.121  The Observer constituted a 
new development in the wide array of activities offered at Lincoln High School.  Building on this 
passion, Bluford then worked for The Lincolnite—Lincoln’s school-wide newspaper.  As a junior 
and senior, Bluford acted as The Lincolnite’s editor and wrote extensively for the yearbook, The 
Lincolnian.122  Bluford credited English teacher Trussie Smothers as her first influence in 
journalism.  As Bluford recalled, Smothers “got me interested in staying after school and 
gathering and writing articles for the [Lincolnite] …and I didn’t mind staying a couple hours 
after school because we liked it and it was enjoyable.  So that’s how I really got interested in 
journalism.”123 
 In addition to writing for Lincoln’s various publications, Bluford read The Kansas City 
Call—Kansas City’s premier black weekly newspaper—regularly.  Bluford specifically found, 
the news editor of The Call, Roy Wilkins’ weekly column “Talking It Over” fascinating.  
Wilkins became “kind of a role model” to Bluford and The Call’s building became a regular after 
school stop for the curious Bluford.124  Furthering Bluford’s interest in journalism was Chester 
Arthur (C.A.) Franklin—founder and editor of The Call and “a neighbor and friend of [the 
Bluford] family”—who did not mind Bluford and other students stopping by the paper’s office 
and inquiring about everything.125 Although, Bluford did not write for The Call during high 
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school, the after school stops into the office, the conversations Bluford had with Wilkins and the 
staff, and the connections Bluford made only deepened her interest in the field.  During these 
formative years, Bluford put her talents and interests in front of C. A. Franklin, who would 
become a longtime manager and influence on Bluford’s journalism career. 
Academically, Bluford was superb.  A consistent honor student, and the valedictorian of 
the senior class in 1928, Bluford was prepared to enter the best universities in the country.126  At 
the end of senior year, Bluford battled with her father about where she would go to university.  
Bluford desired to go to her father’s alma mater, Howard University in Washington D.C., where 
one of her best friends, Thelma Howard, was attending.127  Unable to convince her father to 
allow her to attend Howard, Bluford settled for the University of Kansas, though it was not her 
first choice.   
The University of Missouri, in contrast, was never an option according to Bluford.  The 
segregation at the University of Missouri “was an accepted fact” and Bluford “didn’t have any 
desire to go to the University of Missouri” because she knew it was not a possibility.128  Black 
Missouri students who did not wish to go the Lincoln University for undergraduate education 
paid their own way to out-of-state universities.  Bluford was no exception financing her 
education at the University of Kansas without the support of the Missouri scholarship program.  
In the Gaines and Bluford efforts, the NAACP noticed that “Lincoln was there for 
undergraduates” and there was no graduate education in Missouri.  Additionally, the 
appropriations for graduate out-of-state scholarships did not go into effect until 1931 even 
though the appropriations were allocated a decade earlier.  With Gaines and Bluford, the 
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NAACP attempted to change this reality.129  Bluford expressed a general understanding, but not 
complete acceptance of the segregation that existed in higher education in Missouri.  Segregation 
at the University of Missouri was understood and may have been challenged in the future but for 
eighteen year-old Bluford any sort of fight against the university was out of the question.  
“Pav[ing] the way for me” 
 Years before Lucile Bluford arrived in Lawrence, Kansas to attend the University of 
Kansas, a black woman, Marie Ross, would “pave the way for” Bluford.130  Bluford related that 
Ross took the brunt of the prejudice that accompanied the role of the first black in the Kansas 
journalism program.  There was not a pervasive prejudice among students and professors but 
there was a substantial pushback against Ross by Dean Leon Flint. 
 Flint told Ross that there was no point in her studying journalism since Ross would not be 
able to get a job.  This back and forth between Flint and Ross prompted Ross to contact Roy 
Wilkins of The Call.  Wilkins, according to Bluford, gathered “a stack of black newspapers” and 
he and Ross went to visit Dean Flint.  Once in Dean Flint’s office, Wilkins placed almost a 
hundred issues of black newspapers from around the country on Dean Flint’s desk.  Apparently, 
Dean Flint “had never heard of a black newspaper.”131  Ironically, Bluford and Ross would go on 
to be gainfully employed at The Call while many of their white, female classmates could not 
work in journalism since the Kansas City Star did not hire any women.132  
Admitted but Limited: Years at the University of Kansas 
 Arriving on the University of Kansas’ campus in fall of 1928, Bluford encountered a 
conflicted environment for black students.  Although black students could be admitted to KU, the 
                                                
129 Lucile H. Bluford, interview by Fern S. Ingersoll, May 15, 1989, p. 56. 
130 Lucile H. Bluford, interview by Fern S. Ingersoll, May 13, 1989, p. 21. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., p. 37. 
 
 67 
university and the city of Lawrence still presented significant hurdles and limitations.  Bluford 
experienced these hurdles immediately.  
Unable to live in the dormitories on campus, Bluford, like many other black students, 
lived with local black families.  Bluford, eventually as a member of the sorority Alpha Kappa 
Alpha, joined her fellow sorority sisters in a rented house.  Their housemother was the legendary 
singer Etta Moten, an older KU student at the time.133  Similar to the impossibility of living on-
campus, Bluford noted that black students were not allowed on the sports teams, “couldn’t swim 
in the swimming pool,” and thus were exempt from the swimming requirement for graduation.134  
Despite efforts to change these conditions, Bluford and other black students “didn’t get the 
football team” or any athletic team to include black students.135  This discrimination embodied 
the bittersweet existence of black students at Kansas. 
Personal Activism at the University of Kansas 
 While segregation seemed to be at times unquestioned by Bluford, she and other black 
Kansas students consistently agitated the status quo and challenged local issues of 
discrimination.  In Lawrence, Bluford began to get “worked up about segregation” and grew to 
be active in fighting segregation and discrimination on campus and in Lawrence.136  Bluford 
joined other black students on campus to fight the prejudiced spots of resistance that existed in 
the “integrated” cafeteria.  Off campus, Bluford and sorority sister, Anna Jean McCampbell, 
once decided to go to a segregated theater downtown.  Knowingly, the two sat downstairs in 
white-only section throwing the ushers into a frenzy.  The ushers decided to “[turn] the lights on 
just momentarily” over and over again during the beginning of the movie in an attempt to find 
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Bluford and McCampbell.  Once the ushers found the two, they refused to move leaving the 
ushers in a predicament.137  Stepping out on her own, Bluford developed a curiosity about testing 
segregation in her own personal ways; a curiosity that led to Bluford testing the University of 
Missouri’s response to the Gaines precedent.   
 The myths of the NAACP legal cases and their plaintiffs convey a sense of predestination 
and superhuman powers fighting against great oppositional forces.  Bluford’s anecdotes of 
segregation and resistance during her years at Kansas are significant because they humanize 
Bluford’s efforts and personal evolution with regard to challenging segregation and experiencing 
discrimination firsthand.  Additionally, Bluford’s resistance in Lawrence layers and 
contextualizes her future actions against the University of Missouri.  In the interview with 
Ingersoll, Bluford admittedly did not have any grandiose ideas of fighting segregation on a 
national stage and acknowledged that attempting to attend Missouri was not an option.  Growing 
during her time at Kansas, Bluford’s experiences demonstrate awareness and a fighting spirit 
when confronted with both personal and group discrimination.       
The complete picture of Bluford’s college years is important because the narrative of her 
attempt to integrate Missouri insinuates that the University of Kansas and Lawrence were overly 
friendly and welcoming to black students.  This inherent assumption needs to be corrected.  KU, 
while it admitted black students, was not an overly welcoming place for blacks—students or not.  
Bluford’s time at KU also shows an evolution of Bluford as an activist and a person ready to test 
injustices—traits that would lead to her admission attempt.   
A Growing Journalist 
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  While it would seem obvious that Bluford would transition immediately into the School 
of Journalism, Bluford at first was unsure of what field of study she would undertake at the 
University of Kansas.  Unable to enroll directly into journalism courses as a freshman, Bluford 
explored her options but eventually joined the University Daily Kansan (UDK)—the University 
of Kansas’ student newspaper—as telegraph editor and then night editor.138  It was at the Kansan 
where Bluford, the only black student in journalism, honed her skills and grew her interest in 
journalism.    
 At the end of Bluford’s tenure at the University of Kansas, Bluford was nominated by her 
peers to be inducted into the national journalism honor sorority—Theta Sigma Pi.139  After 
deliberation, the national council decided to not induct Bluford because she was black.  Bluford 
seemed undeterred and noted that many her white colleagues, who had nominated her, “were 
more upset” than she was.140  The Call featured the high-profile rejection by the sorority and 
extended its critique to The Jayhawker—Kansas’ yearly publication—as it described Bluford’s 
rejection in jest.141  The rejection and the related attention was Bluford’s first foray into the 
public light as the subject of discrimination. 
Beginning a Career in Journalism 
 After graduating from the University of Kansas, Bluford took a journalist job with The 
Daily World in Atlanta, Georgia after networking with two fellow students from the Atlanta area.  
Bluford worked in Atlanta just briefly, noting it was “terribly hot”, that “[she] couldn’t get used 
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to those Jim Crow streetcars,” and she sprained her ankle.142  Not happy in Atlanta, Bluford 
decided it was time to return home to Kansas City.  Once returning, Bluford first worked at The 
Call’s competitor, The Kansas City American, since there was available employment.  Shortly 
after beginning work at The American, Bluford received a call from C.A. Franklin.  Franklin 
invited his former employee and mentee back to The Call.  Bluford, extremely grateful, returned 
to The Call, home to her afterschool adventures and summer work.  This return would be the 
start of a long legacy. 
 During the beginning of her professional tenure at The Call, Bluford climbed The Call’s 
leadership ranks.  Always drawn to the “hard news” side of journalism, Bluford worked as a 
court reporter and “covered the police courts…the robberies and shootings, and murders, too.”143  
An active and focused journalist, Bluford continued to grow and became a leader at The Call.  At 
The Call, Bluford encountered a civic attitude that mirrored much of her upbringing.  The Call’s 
mission exemplified the civic attitude by stating the goal “to help man in the firm belief that all 
are hurt as long as anyone is held back.”144  This environment continued to influence and mold 
Bluford’s understanding of the world and her role in transforming society on behalf of her race.  
 After the exit of the managing editor—Mr. Young—in the mid-1930s, Bluford took over 
his duties.  In this position, Bluford was “in charge of the whole news operation,” a great task 
and honor for someone still relatively young.145  Bluford continued to report and manage the 
paper throughout the next six decades.  Bluford’s work and rise to publisher and owner left a 
lasting legacy at The Call and throughout Kansas City. 
                                                
142 Lucile H. Bluford, interview by Fern S. Ingersoll, May 13, 1989, p. 31-32. 
143 Ibid., p. 34. 
144 “The Call Motto,” Kansas City Call, March 3, 1939, accessed June 5, 2014, Missouri Valley 
Special Collections. 
145 Ibid., p. 48. 
 
 71 
Gaines Ignites Bluford’s Curiosity  
 When Lloyd Gaines and the NAACP took his legal challenge against the University of 
Missouri to the United States Supreme Court and won, the black community and other Upper 
South universities took notice.  Surprisingly, for Bluford, the victory marked the first time she 
really began to follow and notice the Gaines case.146  Despite the lack of awareness, the Gaines 
victory sparked a journalistic-like curiosity in Bluford.   
Gaines and the NAACP won their case in December 1938 but Gaines could not be 
admitted to the law school for the spring semester—an already established policy by the 
university.147  This situation gave Missouri the opportunity and the time to build a “separate” and 
supposedly “equal” institution at Lincoln University in Jefferson City.  Bluford, who admittedly 
was not well versed in the case, discovered that Gaines would have to wait until the fall to enroll.  
After this discovery, Bluford’s curiosity took ahold.  Bluford pondered the idea of testing the 
decision in the spring by enrolling in the graduate program at the School of Journalism.  In 1989, 
Bluford elaborated on this curiosity to enroll in the wake of the Gaines decision: 
And I was talking about the curiosity disease.  I said, ‘Now I 
wonder what the University of Missouri would do if he did go in 
February.’  Just curious.  I guess I was a little disappointed that he 
didn’t go on, but if the law school didn’t enroll you, well, they just 
didn’t.  So I said, ‘Well, I believe I’ll apply for graduate work in 
journalism and I can find out what the University of Missouri 
would say.’  So that was really the basic reason that I did it, 
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because I was just kind of curious about what the university would 
do, see.148 
The potential response or lack thereof by Missouri officials to Bluford’s potential attempt to 
enroll seemed to be too much for her to pass up.     
The Initiation of the Enrollment Attempts  
Much of the mystery surrounding the Gaines and Bluford cases is how the plaintiffs 
became a part of the NAACP’s legal strategy and what interaction existed before the official 
attempts to enroll.  Bluford’s “curiosity” and self-initiative corroborated St. Louis lawyer and 
Gaines counsel Sidney Redmond’s account where he stated that “Gaines came and others came 
to me. And they filed applications, several applications were filed. Just like the Blufo[rd] 
Case.”149  Redmond’s recollection is significant because it demonstrates the validity of Bluford’s 
statements with regard to her motive and the history of events since Bluford’s interview with 
Ingersoll took place nearly fifty years after her first attempt to enroll and throughout the 
interview Bluford was admittedly unclear of certain details.  
Combined with Redmond’s explanation regarding Gaines’ contact with the NAACP, one 
can easily deduce that the students were the central originators of their own attempts.  From 
these initiations, the local NAACP and lawyers then presented their plaintiff to the national 
NAACP office and, in particular, Charles Houston.  Houston, in turn, judged whether the 
plaintiffs were 1) suitable and the best candidates to present the NAACP’s case against 
segregation and 2) strategically advantageous to the campaign for educational equality.  Having 
been connected with the NAACP at an early age and also having an impeccable academic, work, 
and personal background, Bluford exceeded Houston’s expectations. 
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Redmond’s accounts of both Gaines and Bluford suggest a new place of emphasis when 
framing test cases and plaintiffs.  The common historical understanding is that the NAACP chose 
plaintiffs.  On the surface this assertion is true; the NAACP did not represent all students who 
submitted applications to graduate schools.  In fact, the NAACP only represented a fraction of 
the potential plaintiffs.  As Tushnet explained, the NAACP discovered early on of “importance 
of central control over litigation” and strong local support.150  However if Donald Murray, Lloyd 
Gaines, and Lucile Bluford are indicative of a larger trend, the primary origination of the legal 
cases came mostly from the plaintiffs not necessarily the local or national branch.  So while the 
NAACP picked certain plaintiffs, the self-determination, courage, and individual initiative of the 
plaintiffs should not be minimized or erased but rather emphasized in history.   
Prepared to Test the Decision 
 Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision mandating Missouri to admit Lloyd Gaines 
to its law school or provide “proper provision for his legal training within the State,” Bluford 
prepared to test the court’s decision by attempting to enroll in Missouri’s legendary graduate 
School of Journalism.151  Having an undergraduate degree in journalism and over seven years of 
professional journalism experience, Bluford reasoned she was more than qualified for admission.  
Accordingly, Bluford sent her transcript and a letter to S. W. Canada—the University Registrar 
who denied Lloyd Gaines three years earlier.  In a similar manner, unaware of Bluford’s race, 
Canada wrote back in a letter dated January 19, 1939, “while it is sufficient to admit you to our 
Graduate School I must refer it to Dean Frank L. Martin…I think you must expect to call at this 
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office after you come to Columbia for your permit to enroll.”152  In this correspondence, Canada 
admitted Bluford had an academic record worthy of admission to the Graduate School and 
encouraged Bluford to come to Columbia, Missouri to enroll in classes.  This unknowing 
concession would become critical since Canada considered Bluford’s academic record adequate 
for admission without including race as a factor.  
A Start with the NAACP 
Equipped with a physical document inviting Bluford to Columbia, Missouri to enroll at 
Missouri, Bluford reached out to the NAACP’s Charles Hamilton Houston—special counsel for 
Lloyd Gaines and who now worked as a contracted lawyer for the NAACP.  Houston responded 
encouraging Bluford to go forward with her plan to try and enroll.  Houston enumerated five 
reasons why Bluford’s attempt and potential success at admission will help the campaign to 
integrate higher education: 
1. It will focus attention on Negro women.  So far our test cases 
have been men.  The only girl whose case we ever had for a short 
time was that of Alice Jackson of Richmond, Virginia.  She 
applied to the University of Virginia for graduate work in English.  
Virginia passed a scholarship act and her case took an inactive 
status.  Yours would be the first case of a Negro woman actually 
being accepted and either admitted or refused at a State university. 
2. It will keep the legislature of Missouri from going off half 
cocked on the law school.  It will show it that the problem cannot 
be solved by putting a law school at Lincoln University. 
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3. It will keep public attention focused on the University problem.  
A rejection by you would have much more publicity value than a 
rejection of a man. 
4.  The School of Journalism at the University of Missouri is about 
the best and your applying will forces its hand on whether the 
school stands for liberal principles. 
5. If you get in, you have the satisfaction of opening a new door.153  
This correspondence would be the beginning of a solid relationship as both Houston and Bluford 
worked closely to make Missouri adhere to the Gaines precedent. 
Interestingly, the first letter written by Bluford to Houston was dated January 25, 1939, as 
Houston noted in his response dated January 27, 1939.  However, this letter has yet to be 
unearthed and may have been the contentious correspondence discussed by Missouri’s lawyers in 
future court proceedings.  In Bluford’s oral interview with Ingersoll, the two discussed the 
potentially contentious nature of the missing correspondence.  Ingersoll told Bluford a story 
related to her by Dorothy Davis—Bluford’s friend and colleague at The Call— regarding the 
correspondence.  Ingersoll explained Davis’ story, “but you were so afraid that they might hold it 
against you, the way things were at that time, that you and [Dorothy Davis] flushed it down the 
toilet.”154  Bluford mentioned that she did not remember the story but emphasized how critical 
the correspondence was to the defense.  The discovery of correspondence would shine more light 
on the exact motives and the first actions of Bluford in her attempt to enroll.  However in 
retrospect, the letter could be very simple and to the point.  Bluford expressed a great deal of 
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concern for even the simplest correspondence since “the lawyers made a whole lot out of [the 
letters].”155  Most of the surviving correspondence at the time was contentious because any sort 
of communication constituted a conspiracy. The missing correspondence more than likely would 
probably not reveal much since Houston and Bluford always wrote in a professional manner and 
Houston rarely instructed the plaintiffs to do certain tasks especially at the beginning of the case.    
The Attempt at Admission 
 Heeding S. W. Canada’s advice and Houston’s encouragement, Bluford arrived on the 
University of Missouri’s campus on January 30, 1939 to inquire about enrolling in the Graduate 
School of Journalism.  After discovering that Bluford was, in fact, black, Canada denied her 
admission giving the reason that “the Gaines case [was] not yet settled.”156  Bluford immediately 
sent Charles Houston a telegram stating, “DENIED ADMITTANCE TODAY SAY GAINES 
CASE STILL UNSETTLED MANDATE NOT YET IN COLUMBIA NO TROUBLE LETTER 
FOLLOWS.”157  In an article entitled “Nothing Will Happen Negro Student Is Admitted to 
M.U.” published in The Call on February 3, 1939, Bluford told her story of traveling to 
Columbia.  Bluford’s personal anecdote clearly aimed to downplay any fear mongering by the 
state of Missouri and its university.  Bluford recounted that “after spending two hours on the M. 
U. campus… [she was] thoroughly convinced that the students are not perturbed over a Negro’s 
entrance.”158  Bluford explained the students at Missouri were similar to the white students she 
studied with at the University of Kansas.  To emphasize this point, Bluford wrote, “[she] found 
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no animosity” on campus.159  When Bluford actually tried to enroll at the journalism school, 
Bluford related “a member of the journalism faculty said that the professors and instructors had 
no objection to teaching a Negro.”160  Transitioning, Bluford explained why the University of 
Missouri was her “logical choice,” and emphasized that the university admitted many out-of-
state students, international students including many students of different races, and that she was 
a resident of Missouri but she was not allowed to enroll. 
 The publication of Bluford’s story of her time in Columbia and on Missouri’s campus 
served the legal case in three ways.  It attempted to alter the understanding of many in the black 
community—as The Call was not widely read in the white community—who perhaps still 
viewed the integration of white universities as possibly violent and not a worthwhile venture.  
Secondly, with scholarships offered for out-of-state tuition Bluford explained why she wanted to 
return to school and why the University of Missouri was her preferred program of study.  
Unknowingly, the supposed desire to return to school would become a point of contention in the 
court proceedings.  Thirdly, the publication aimed to expose, again, that Missouri admitted 
students of different races and nationalities but still refused to admit certain Missouri citizens—
its black citizens.  
 One of the potential complications of Bluford’s admission attempt was that she did not 
appeal to the University of Missouri or Lincoln University before submitting her first 
application.  Bluford eventually submitted an appeal with President Middlebush and the Board of 
Curators but the fact that she did not make contact before going to Columbia proved to be 
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problematic.161  Mark Tushnet argues that this strategy—or action—by Bluford and by extension 
the NAACP was a fatal mistake.  Tushnet’s analysis is correct in that the failure of Bluford to 
inquire about more details gave Missouri’s legal team an unnecessarily powerful argument, 
especially since the argument debuted in the Gaines case to some extent.  However, upon closer 
analysis this point seems to be somewhat exaggerated.  Bluford’s self-stated purpose was to test 
the Gaines precedent—a mandate to admit students who desired educational opportunities not 
available at Lincoln University.  Bluford reasoned the state of Missouri did provide graduate 
education in journalism for its black citizens therefore it would have to admit black students like 
Bluford to the University of Missouri or provide segregated education as Missouri had done with 
the Lincoln Law School.  It was the logical step to test the Gaines precedent immediately and 
without asking for “permission” despite the ongoing appeal.  The NAACP and Bluford wanted to 
test the quickness of MU’s response to an over-qualified student armed with a month-old U.S. 
Supreme Court decision and encouraged by an MU official to enroll based on her academic 
merit.  Asking for permission would have undermined the NAACP’s practical application of the 
Gaines precedent. 
With the Gaines decision unsettled and Bluford’s subsequent denial, the NAACP had to 
decide whether to wait to push Bluford’s case into the courts or to take action concurrently with 
the Gaines appeal proceedings.  Given the precedent and momentum of the Gaines case, the 
NAACP leadership was hopeful for Bluford’s eventual appeal.  However, the NAACP did not 
pursue a legal case immediately after Bluford’s rejection.  This lack of action on behalf of the 
NAACP signaled an intention to see the Gaines case through and to prepare for a potential action 
on behalf of Bluford if it was necessary and when they were fully prepared. 
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Evading the Gaines Decision—The Taylor Bill and the Community Response 
Almost immediately after Lucile Bluford’s attempt to enroll, the Missouri State 
Legislature began to act.  On February 3, 1939, four days after Bluford visited Columbia State 
Representative John D. Taylor of Charlton County introduced a bill to the legislature.162  Named 
after Taylor, House Bill 195 intended to comply with the Gaines decision by giving the Lincoln 
University Board of Curators more powers and requiring them to “to reorganize said institution 
so that it shall afford to the Negro people of the state opportunity for training up to the standard 
furnished by the state University of Missouri.”163  The Taylor Bill also appropriated $200,000 for 
Lincoln University in order for them to meet the requirements of the Gaines decision.  Ideally, 
the legislature wanted the $200,000 to be used to create a law school.  However, the underlying 
reason behind the bill was to shift the burden even more onto the ill equipped and underfunded 
Lincoln University.  The strategy of shifting the burden continued to be a mainstay in the 
defense’s arguments against Bluford and the NAACP.  The Taylor Bill pushed the debate from 
“existent” graduate education “within” the state of Missouri to a debate of what was considered a 
timely response by the state in establishing new segregated educational programs and whether 
the programs were to be considered truly equal to their counterparts at Missouri. 
 Charles Houston and the NAACP recognized the necessity of working with strong local 
branches when they brought equalization and integration cases to court.  Much of the support 
needed by the national NAACP and Houston came from prominent local leaders and attorneys.  
This relationship relegated regular NAACP and community members to the areas of fundraising 
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and general community support.  However with the proposal of the Taylor Bill in the Missouri 
legislature, local black communities were commissioned to do something more than just 
fundraising: orchestrate a letter writing campaign to stop the Taylor Bill.  Though the campaign 
was unsuccessful, the black community—fraternities, sororities, churches, unions, and individual 
citizens—inundated Governor Lloyd Stark with letters pleading for him to veto the Taylor Bill.  
Some letters were lengthy, detailing numerous reasons why they opposed the legislation.  Others 
were brief, epitomized by the letter sent by St. Louis attorneys S. E. Garner and Richard W. Kent 
who wrote “that [the] Taylor Bill No. 195 is a miscarriage of justice and respectfully urge that 
you veto same” and nothing more.164  The letter writing campaign demonstrated that even though 
the black community was not directly involved in the inner workings of the NAACP’s legal 
campaign there was a place for a strong local branch and a supportive local black community. 
Waiting to Push the Case    
After visiting Columbia on January 30, Bluford continued her work at The Call as the 
NAACP prepared her legal case and continued to work on the Gaines appeal.  Despite a busy 
work schedule, Bluford stayed involved in the effort against the University of Missouri.  Upon 
request of Houston, Bluford attended the Gaines hearing at the Missouri Supreme Court in 
Jefferson City on May 22.165  Throughout the spring and summer of 1939, Bluford wrote lengthy 
correspondence with the NAACP leaders who advised her to continue communication with both 
Missouri and Lincoln university officials.  Many of NAACP officials offered their support and 
their words signaled that Bluford was known to many of them.  William Pickens wrote to 
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Bluford “you are doubtless the Lucille Bluford who is applying for admission to the University 
of Missouri…Give my best regards to your mother, father and other friends.  I hope to see them 
again before many months.”166  C.A. Franklin of The Call wrote Walter White about a host of 
topics but mentioned that with regard to Bluford it was “odd to have news about yourself and 
your organization came back to you.”167  The personal relationships with both Pickens and 
Franklin paint the picture that Bluford was in fact engrained in a civic-orientated culture, 
especially with the NAACP.  However, the unknowing ways in which Franklin and Pickens 
address Bluford’s attempt show Bluford’s initiative was more independent of guidance and 
influence by the NAACP than Missouri’s lawyers wanted the public to believe. 
 Bluford’s correspondence with university officials included much of the same—stalling 
tactics.  S.W. Canada, in keeping with Missouri’s past policy position, instructed Bluford to 
request a journalism program at Lincoln University.  Canada pointed Bluford in the direction of 
the Lincoln Board of Curators to place her request.  Accordingly, these types of communications 
served as evidence for Bluford’s legal case.  They documented the absence of a journalism 
program at Lincoln and the evasive nature of Missouri university officials thus setting up the 
NAACP with potentially successful and damning evidence.  This technical and procedural 
correspondence was indicative of the Bluford’s tedious and lengthy legal journey with the 
NAACP. 
In a holding pattern, Bluford attempted to enroll at Missouri again in person in September 
1939 for the fall semester only to receive a letter from S.W. Canada simply stating “HAVE NO 
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AUTHORITY TO ADMIT YOU.”168  This letter coincided with the establishment of the Lincoln 
Law School in St. Louis.  Charles Houston needed Bluford to apply again as “[he] doubt[ed] if 
[Missouri] would erect a segregated School of Journalism” in addition to the law school.169  
Additionally, C.A. Franklin was in the process of lining up other students to push the 
establishment of more graduate schools at the University of Missouri such as a school of 
medicine.  With the Gaines case being appealed, Bluford’s second attempt to enroll, the 
establishment of the law school, and continuous correspondence, the fall of 1939 was a hectic 
but also crucial time for the NAACP in Missouri.  Positioned at the intersection of the end of the 
Gaines case and the beginning of the Bluford case, Houston and Redmond were trying to make 
sense of what moves to make next. 
Lloyd Gaines Goes Missing and the Dropping of Gaines v. Canada 
 In the close circles of the NAACP it had been known for some time that Gaines might be 
missing.  No one had been able to communicate with Lloyd Gaines since April 1939 when Frank 
Wethers, a library assistant at Lincoln, had received a letter from Gaines.170  The NAACP 
orchestrated an internal search for the victorious plaintiff in order for him to be present during 
the appeal process when necessary.  Sidney Redmond worked tirelessly seeking out leads with 
Gaines’ friends and family to locate him.  However in the late summer and early fall of 1939, the 
situation regarding Gaines’ whereabouts slowly became more clear.  Internal NAACP 
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correspondence shows that potential leads were drying up and prospects of Gaines returning to 
the courtroom to defend his precedent were becoming slimmer. 
 Expanding the search to include the press and the public in October of 1939, rumors of 
Gaines’ whereabouts spread throughout the country.  Some believed Gaines went to Mexico and 
others believed him to be dead.  Nobody knew for certain where Gaines went.  Houston and 
others in NAACP thought they could hold off until the case was to be retried in January 1940.  
This thought process changed in late December when Sidney Redmond requested an answer 
from Houston as to whether Redmond should drop the Gaines case.  With the Bluford case 
prepped and ready, Gaines’ disappearance was now negatively affecting the campaign.171  By the 
New Year, Houston and Thurgood Marshall realized it was not possible to defend MU’s appeal 
of the Gaines decision with Gaines missing.  They would have been forced to advocate for 
admitting a missing student to the University of Missouri—a difficult prospect in the already 
hostile Missouri State Supreme Court.  Accordingly, NAACP and Charles Houston felt 
continuing the Gaines case was both legally and financially futile, especially considering they 
had another qualified candidate—Lucile Bluford—ready to test the unsettled precedent. 
Filing the Bluford Case 
 Faced with the dropping of the Gaines case throughout the fall of 1939, the NAACP 
turned to Lucile Bluford who had been applying pressure on the University of Missouri 
administration and the state legislature to admit her to Missouri’s School of Journalism.  
Bluford’s action also implicitly challenged Missouri to appropriate funds not only for a 
segregated law school but also a journalism school, both costly endeavors. Throughout 1939, 
Charles Houston advised Bluford as to what steps to take to best prepare their case.  Following 
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his own strategy of being patient and preparing airtight legal cases, Houston waited until Bluford 
had been denied admission twice, there was a substantial amount of documented dialogue 
between Bluford, the NAACP, and the various university officials, and when Houston seriously 
doubted Gaines’ return to Missouri.  
 On October 6 and 13 of 1939, the NAACP filed two cases on behalf of Lucile Bluford.  
The first action was a federal civil rights suit aiming to recover monetary damages due to the 
“loss of half a year’s training and the probable loss of the balance of the year’s work.”172  The 
damages suit would place Bluford’s appeal in federal court and attempt to win a decision 
declaring that Missouri and S.W. Canada’s actions violated Bluford’s Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.  The second state suit filed on behalf of Bluford petitioned for a writ of mandamus to 
admit her to the school of journalism.  Both cases intertwined throughout the following years and 
encompassed almost the same arguments.  The most significant suit—for the NAACP national 
strategy and this work—was the mandamus suit attempting to validate what Gaines had achieved 
in legal terms but not in reality. 
This step forward by the NAACP signaled a unique situation and progression in the 
NAACP’s campaign for educational equality.  In attempting to enroll in January 1939 only a 
month after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in favor of Lloyd Gaines, Bluford was the first 
person to test the decision’s precedent.  Most importantly, Bluford was testing the precedent in 
the same state, against the same university, and for admission to a different graduate program.  
The Gaines and Bluford cases were the first two-pronged attack by the NAACP against a single 
state and university. The strategy harkens back to the early plans to force states to provide 
massive resources for a few students in hopes of forcing the state to take fiscally irresponsible 
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chance to expand and maintain segregated education.  Throughout both cases, Houston and local 
leaders constantly searched for more plaintiffs and students to keep the pressure on Missouri and 
to force the university to establish more graduate schools for such few black students.  
The Bluford Team—A Nationally Coordinated Case 
 Houston and the NAACP team of lawyers viewed the basis of their legal success in terms 
of strong local support and also centralized national control.  Gaines v. Canada was a perfect 
example of how support from a strong local branch and leadership from the central NAACP 
organization led to a successful case.  Bluford’s situation differed slightly.  As in Gaines v. 
Canada, Charles Houston was the lead counsel for Bluford’s legal case.  The supporting 
lawyers—such as Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond—remained mostly the same except these 
lawyers were from St. Louis not Kansas City.  The most prominent Kansas City lawyer involved 
was Carl Johnson, who would become the future president of Kansas City NAACP Branch and 
the first black judge elected in Kansas City.  C.A. Franklin of The Call also provided support 
and, at times, conferred with Houston.   
 Local lawyers, both in St. Louis and Kansas City, played a role in Bluford’s legal 
journey.  However, Charles Houston took on most of the case’s workload.  Bluford later 
confirmed this, stating, “[The local lawyers] helped a little bit but Houston did most of the 
work.”173  Charles Houston led the team and orchestrated Bluford’s case in the courtroom.  It is 
clear that the national NAACP took a great interest in Bluford’s case since it was best positioned 
to uphold their most important victory to date—Gaines v. Canada. 
 While local lawyers did not take center stage in Bluford’s litigation, the local branches 
both in Kansas City and St. Louis were key in keeping the legal efforts afloat financially.  
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Throughout the Gaines and Bluford cases, national NAACP figures such as Charles Houston, 
William Pickens, and Walter White traveled to both Missouri cities and fundraised at speeches 
and mass meetings.  The Great Depression and the failure of the Garland Fund to grant 
consistent funds placed the NAACP in a precarious financial position.  Charles Houston and 
Thurgood Marshall were known as personally charitable with regard to their time and services.  
However, both had personal lives that needed financial stability and a consistent income.  In 
response, the NAACP worked diligently to pay Houston and other lawyers a fair wage for their 
work.  The national NAACP leaders set specific fundraising numbers for the Bluford case—
$1,500 for St. Louis, $1,500 for Kansas City, and $500 for the rest of the state.174  Unfortunately, 
many of these fundraising efforts fell short of their goals.  Nonetheless, the NAACP relied on 
local branches to help support the NAACP and the plaintiffs as they attempted to bring about 
change through the court system. 
 The Bluford case presented a situation in which Charles Houston took an even more 
hands on approach than he had with Gaines v. Canada.  In the Bluford efforts, Houston 
continued to enlist on his St. Louis team of Henry Espy and Sidney Redmond but did not petition 
for much help from the Kansas City NAACP leaders.  Although there was support in Bluford’s 
hometown of Kansas City, the case exhibited a more statewide support structure in contrast to 
the Gaines proceedings, which were solidly based in St. Louis. 
 The year 1939 presented limitations and opportunities for the NAACP in Missouri.  With 
Gaines missing, the NAACP’s momentum slowed but was not completely stopped.  Bluford 
gave the NAACP another quality opportunity in which to fight segregation at the University of 
Missouri and throughout Missouri.  Houston early on would say that the “Bluford case is the 
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most favorable case possible for testing out factual educational equality.”175  It was also in 1939 
that the Missouri State legislature had changed rules to the funding to Lincoln University and 
provided an additional $200,000 to establish a law school—though not a journalism program—to 
comply with the Gaines v. Canada decision.  The evasion of university officials and the actions 
taken by the Missouri legislature signaled to the NAACP that Missouri would not easily let up its 
resistance to integration.  The intersection of both cases and the related legislation directly 
connects the Bluford and Gaines efforts in the context of what was occurring in Missouri. 
Lucile Bluford—The Plaintiff 
 Lucile Bluford’s background was critical in the NAACP choosing her to be its plaintiff 
following Lloyd Gaines.  The NAACP won the Supreme Court precedent and then Gaines 
disappeared.  Houston needed a dependable, strong, and stalwart plaintiff.  In preparing 
Bluford’s case arguments, Houston noted that “not only [is Bluford] a graduate of Journalism but 
she is actually Managing Editor of the Kansas City Call.  Her experience calls for the most 
advanced courses possible in graduate work.  Lincoln University is absolutely up against it.”  
Since Missouri’s School of Journalism was considered one of the best in the country, Houston 
reasoned that it would take an extraordinary effort and a large sum of money to make Lincoln 
University’s School of Journalism equal.  Additionally, Houston knew that because of Bluford’s 
extensive background in journalism Bluford needed the highest-level of graduate education 
possible—something that Lincoln University would unlikely be able to provide.  Unlike Gaines 
and Donald Murray, Bluford possessed excellent and specific undergraduate training in the 
academic field and more than seven years of practical experience.  Combined with her strong 
personality and the excellence of the Missouri’ School of Journalism, Bluford, in Houston’s 
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opinion, was the best option “for testing out factual educational equality.” 176  Bluford’s case 
transitioned the NAACP’s focus from the establishment of education within the state to 
challenging Missouri’s commitment to establishing and supporting segregated education and 
questioning the segregated education’s supposed equal nature. 
Bluford’s First Court Proceeding  
 After filing both of Bluford’s cases and eventually dropping Gaines’ case, the NAACP 
prepared for the first of many hearings regarding Bluford’s request for a writ of mandamus.  
Scheduled for February 5, 1940, the NAACP began to prepare arguments to be heard with the 
same judge—Judge W.M. Dinwiddie—and the same opposing lawyer—W.S. Hogsett, S.W. 
Canada’s counsel—who participated in the Gaines proceedings.  The impending Bluford legal 
case was considered an extension and continuation of the Gaines case but possessed its own 
nuances. 
From February 8 through the 10, Houston and Bluford presented their case to a packed 
Boone County Courthouse in Columbia, Missouri.  Sympathetic white, female students from 
nearby Stephens College “stood four deep in the rear and sides of the room and sat on the floor 
in front of the seats” to hear Houston and Hogsett argue their points for and against Bluford’s 
admission to Missouri.177  In the wake of the Gaines decision, people—black and white—now 
seemed to take the NAACP’s actions more seriously. 
 Houston thoroughly explained the entire case in a simple and slow manner as to nuture 
support from the white, female students in the courtroom—who were primed to be sympathetic 
based on their own limitations as women, illustrated by Bluford’s stories of the lack of 
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employment of her white, female colleagues at the University of Kansas.  The overarching 
argument put forth by Houston centered on Bluford’s appeal as a continuation of the Gaines 
decision.  The Gaines precedent mandated that Missouri provide equal education for Bluford 
within Missouri’s borders or admit her to the university.  Using the yearlong correspondence that 
accompanied Bluford’s first two attempts at admission, Houston demonstrated that S.W. Canada, 
unaware at the time of her application that Bluford was black, acknowledged Bluford was 
qualified based on merit.  Secondly, the correspondence between Bluford and Lincoln University 
showed Lincoln was not able to provide a journalism program, especially one equal to 
Missouri’s School of Journalism with already appropriated funds from the Taylor Bill.  Bluford’s 
counsel also produced N.A. Sweets’—the St. Louis lawyer—application to Missouri’s 
journalism program to show that the idea of black students desiring a journalism school was not 
a new concept.  Simply put, Houston argued that Bluford was in fact qualified for graduate 
education, the Gaines decision provided a clear mandate, the University of Missouri and Lincoln 
University did not meet that mandate, and the Taylor Bill, which had established the law school, 
was not adequate to establish a separate and equal journalism school at Lincoln.  Thus, Bluford 
should have been admitted immediately.  
 To demonstrate the need for Bluford to attend graduate school and the level of education 
Bluford required, Houston called many of her co-workers and supervisors at The Call to the 
stand.  Dowdal Davis—the business manager at The Call—explained that The Call would benefit 
greatly from better educated and well rounded staff members.  With graduate education, Bluford 
would ideally develop administrative, business, and writing skills specific to journalism.  
Highlighting Bluford’s seven years of professional experience and undergraduate education, 
Houston hoped to force the University of Missouri and the state government to provide the most 
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extensive and the highest quality journalism education since Bluford would not benefit from 
introductory coursework.  Unlike Gaines and Murray, Bluford’s experience and education 
demanded a true equalization—or integration—of educational programs and facilities. 
 Hogsett countered Houston with three points.  He argued that Bluford was suing the 
wrong school.  According to Missouri’s lawyers, Bluford needed to sue Lincoln University since 
it was responsible for providing education for black Missourians.  Second, Hogsett contended 
that S.W. Canada was not in a superior position and thus was not responsible due to his inability 
to make policy.  Lastly, Hogsett portrayed Bluford’s application to the School of Journalism as 
“not in good faith [as] she was merely acting” on behalf of the NAACP’s wishes.  These 
contentions would be continually dragged out throughout subsequent hearings. 
 To emphasize his conspiracy theory, Hogsett specifically pointed to The Call’s coverage 
of the Taylor Bill and the fact that Bluford was employed at The Call.  In Hogsett’s view, the 
NAACP, The Call, and Lucile Bluford in launching an all-out media assault did not let the 
legislature adequately comply with the Gaines v. Canada decision.  This was evidence that the 
NAACP did not truly want equal educational opportunities for blacks but simply wanted to 
integrate MU.  Houston countered by pointing out the dramatic funding inequalities to Hogsett.  
Hogsett’s NAACP conspiracy theory became the prevailing argument to delegitimize the 
NAACP in the eyes of the court and the broader Missouri public.178  
 The packed courtroom full of young, white female college students provided a lively 
environment and one of the most notable of the Bluford legal proceedings.  When Bluford was 
called to the stand to testify and defend her credentials, she and Hogsett began to argue about the 
missing correspondence—the one Dorothy Davis said Bluford flushed down the toilet.  Bluford 
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submitted thirteen letters to Missouri’s lawyers prior to the trial but did not submit all of the 
correspondence.  Hogsett insisted that Bluford and the NAACP reveal the concealed 
correspondence or at least its contents.  Bluford did not budge.  The correspondence was 
personal and private between client and counsel, Bluford claimed.     
   The contentious exchanged elicited a loud applause from the white students whose 
sympathy had been masterly groomed by Houston throughout the proceedings.  Houston 
admitted that he “tried the case as a social issue as well as a legal issue” and that “the courtroom 
was with him.”179  The students’ boisterous response drew a sharp rebuke from Judge Dinwiddie 
who then ordered the courtroom to be cleared—all of which contributed to an unusual event in 
the history of Boone County Court.180  The outburst from the Stephens College students was so 
noteworthy, The Kansas City Star entitled its story on the trial, “GIRLS DISRUPT A 
COURT.”181  Houston—as he had been in the past—was strategic with both his legal arguments 
and his use of drama to create the best environment for success. 
 Aside from the excitement, the role of Lincoln University officials in Bluford’s 
proceedings produced the most interesting dynamic.  Black colleges and universities played a 
unique role in the NAACP’s legal campaign.  When Sidney Redmond desired a plaintiff to 
challenge Missouri’s segregation in higher education, he reached out to Lincoln University.  
When the University of Missouri needed to inform Gaines to look elsewhere for his education, 
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Lincoln University delivered the news.  Lincoln officials had to straddle both sides in order to 
maintain state support and also support what most at Lincoln University thought was just.  
This dynamic played out throughout the Gaines and Bluford cases but was best illustrated 
in a telephone exchange in late December 1939.  Confidentially, Lincoln President Sherman 
Scruggs called Roy Wilkins—the former Kansas City Call employee—in an attempt to find 
qualified journalism instructors.  Scruggs explained to Wilkins “the minimum requirements were 
a graduate degree in journalism and five years teaching experience.”182  Wilkins telegraphed 
Scruggs answering that he did not know of any qualified candidates because “ironically 
restrictions upon negroes in graduate schools and faculties prevent qualification for the posts you 
mentioned.”183 The precise motive behind Scruggs’ inquiry is unclear since there were no major 
overtures to establish a journalism school at Lincoln or admit Bluford to the University of 
Missouri at the time.  However, the apparent attempt to comply or to prepare to comply with the 
Gaines precedent contrasted greatly with how Lincoln officials conducted themselves at the 
Bluford trial. 
W.S. Hogsett called I.C. Tull—Lincoln University’s Business Manager—to the witness 
stand in hopes Tull would testify that Lincoln possessed adequate funding and planned to 
accommodate Bluford’s educational needs soon.  Tull surprised Missouri’s counsel when he 
unwaveringly denied this assertion stating, “never in my 24 years that I have been at Lincoln has 
the state appropriated half of what we asked for.”  Then Alberta Hall—secretary to President 
Scruggs and the Lincoln Board of Curators—demonstrated to Hogsett and the audience that there 
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were no funds available for a journalism school.184  These seeming about-faces by Lincoln 
University officials indicated a complicated existence for black universities and the manner in 
which they navigated the court cases, state directives, and the wishes of the black community. 
Bluford and the NAACP’s first foray in court had a flair for the dramatic.  Sympathetic 
white, female students applauded Bluford loudly; a courtroom cleared; contentious exchanges 
were had; and “allies” switched sides.  All of this contributed to elevate Bluford as the next 
central NAACP plaintiff.  Amidst the drama, both Houston and Hogsett laid out their 
understanding of the Gaines decision and how it applied to Bluford’s application.  Houston 
situated Bluford as a qualified student who was simply acting as a continuation of the Gaines 
decision—since there was no separate journalism program in Missouri.  Hogsett countered by 
shifting the burden to Lincoln University to provide education and worked to paint Bluford and 
the NAACP as insincere in their efforts to gain Bluford admission.  These arguments would lead 
to the central questions of Bluford v. Canada: how long does the state have to comply with 
educational requests from black students? And once these separate programs are established, are 
they of an equal nature to their University of Missouri counterparts?  
In the press, the first proceeding was well received.  A young black woman stood up to a 
white lawyer and a state university on a national stage.  The story almost wrote itself.  The Call’s 
headline—“White Students Crowd Courtroom for Two-Day Bluford vs. M.U. Trial: Sentiment 
Favors Admittance of Negro to University of Missouri; Judge Dinwiddie Reserves Decision”—
concisely summed up the experience.185  After the proceedings, Houston noted that he “was 
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much better prepared than the Gaines case which I had left for my Missouri fellows to 
prepare.”186  Despite this preparation and confidence of Houston, Judge Dinwiddie—nearly four 
months after the trial—decided against Bluford and the NAACP because no prior appeal was 
made to Lincoln University.  Dinwiddie also confided to Houston at the reading of the decision 
“that the time was not ripe for Negroes to attend the U. of Missouri.”187  The NAACP appealed 
the decision immediately, thus prolonging legal process. 
Preparing for the Appeal 
 After the disappointing loss in the first mandamus trial, Houston, Bluford and the 
NAACP prepared to re-try the case in the Missouri State Supreme Court.  Houston anticipated 
that the State Supreme Court would hold off on hearing the case thus giving the legislature time 
to respond—as it did with the Gaines case.188  The lengthy lull between the trial and the appeal 
gave Houston and Bluford a chance to strategize and keep the pressure on Missouri.  Beginning 
with her first attempt to enroll, Bluford consistently attempted to enroll and register at the 
University of Missouri every semester.  Additionally, Bluford applied for the non-existent 
School of Journalism at Lincoln University.  However when Bluford made her application to 
Lincoln both in September and December 1940, she was told that journalism would not be 
offered until February 1, 1941 and that “it remains for the State Legislature to provide such 
legislative appropriations as are necessary.”189  Anticipating these types of responses, Bluford 
relayed the information to S.W. Canada and informed him that because “graduate work in 
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journalism [was] unavailable elsewhere in the state, [she was] therefore applying for admittance 
to the University of Missouri School of Journalism for graduate work for the fall semester of the 
school year 1940-41.”190  The pressure functioned strategically as Bluford forced officials at both 
universities to admit the lack of journalism programs for black students and show them that she 
was not giving up her fight.  The blatant correspondence between Bluford and the universities’ 
officials built Houston’s case for the appeal. 
 As Houston and the NAACP prepared for Bluford’s appeal, external support began to 
unravel.  Finances were always difficult for the NAACP and began to be a problem again as 
Bluford’s appeal approached.  Accordingly, the national branch depended on the local 
branches—Kansas City and St. Louis—to fund most of the legal costs in the Bluford case.  
Despite the strength and numbers of the St. Louis branch, the required funding never 
materialized.  Just after the New Year in 1941, the Kansas City branch—which aside from 
holding large fundraisers never could effectively support the Bluford efforts—slowed its support 
even more.  In a letter to Thurgood Marshall, Houston indicated “it [was] apparent the national 
office will have to bear the expense. The Kansas City branch writes it cannot go farther.”191  
Marshall wrote back that the national office only had $1,000 available to continue the Missouri 
cases.  Noting the lack of funds, Marshall contemplated the dilemma of running two legal 
cases—the mandamus and the damages cases—simultaneously and wondered if Houston needed 
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to end one of them.192  With the new mandamus trial set for the May term, the NAACP needed to 
make a decision quickly. 
$65,000 Appropriated for Journalism School 
 The 1939 Taylor Bill appropriated what C.A. Franklin of the Kansas City Call called “a 
beggarly $200,000.”193  The appropriation was used to establish the Lincoln University Law 
School at Poro College in St. Louis.  Lloyd Gaines was supposed to attend Lincoln’s Law 
School, and thus the state of Missouri would have satisfied the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision.  
However, Lincoln University utilized all $200,000—even though Lincoln argued it needed more 
funding—to establish the law school. This left no funds to establish other graduate schools 
should the need arise.  For Lincoln, Missouri, and the state of Missouri, the need to establish 
another graduate school arose immediately.  Lucile Bluford’s inquiry for admission to MU and 
then for a journalism school at Lincoln exhibited the NAACP’s strategy of forcing Missouri—
which took the bait—to establish a number of expensive graduate schools.  
 As Charles Houston anticipated, Missouri and its State Supreme Court were slow to act 
on Bluford’s appeal in the mandamus case.  The delay allowed Missouri to scrape up enough 
funds to establish a “suitable” journalism school at Lincoln.  The funds came in an appropriation 
of $65,000, which were made available immediately for the Lincoln Board of Curators to 
allocate for the journalism school. With any action made by Missouri and MU, Charles Houston 
had more questions.  Would the Lincoln University’s Journalism School be equal to that at 
Missouri?  What specifically would Lincoln offer in terms of facilities, staff, and curriculum?  
Will it include graduate education?  And when would the school be ready?  The NAACP had 
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won the argument that the Upper South states had to provide education within each of state’s 
borders.  Houston and others wanted to test whether or not Missouri was be ready and willing to 
expand graduate education for black students. Missouri through establishing a law school and 
now a journalism school—albeit slowly and underfunded—showed their commitment to 
segregated education.  Now, the questions raised by Houston indicated that the NAACP had to 
contend with the question of whether separate graduate education was equal to its white 
counterparts—another step in the process of breaking down segregation. 
 Upon learning of the appropriation, Bluford went to investigate at both the University of 
Missouri and Lincoln University.  Having visited Jefferson City and President Sherman Scruggs, 
Bluford reported to Houston, Marshall, and Redmond that “the Lincoln University Journalism 
School [was] still on paper.”  Scruggs explained the plans for the building and showed Bluford 
where the school would be housed temporarily—the basement of the old girls’ dormitory, which 
at the time housed “a ping-pong table and a dozen or so chairs.”  In addition to the absurd 
conditions of the temporary school, President Scruggs’ insisted that the school would not be 
open for the spring 1941 semester, which prompted Bluford to once again to visit the University 
of Missouri and its registrar, S.W. Canada.194 
 Conditioned to denial and emboldened by the stagnant movement on the Lincoln 
University Journalism School, Bluford confronted S.W. Canada again in Columbia, Missouri.  
Missouri officials in surviving documents were muted throughout most of the Bluford case but 
this encounter in early February 1941 prompted Canada to provide a transcript of his encounter 
with Bluford.  Canada’s self-written transcript of the encounter portrays Bluford as annoyed and 
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demanding.195  In Bluford’s account, Canada “was friendlier than on any of [her] previous visits” 
perhaps emboldened by his recent wins in both the mandamus and damages cases.  Always 
professional, Bluford beginning to show some stress wrote, exasperated, “I am pretty well fed up 
on Missouri ‘justice’ and at this moment am so blooming angry that I am tempted to go back to 
Columbia Friday…and sit in classes until they put me out.”196  The interaction underscored the 
personal impact the legal case had on the relatively even-tempered Bluford.  The exchange with 
Canada would be a turning point for Bluford as she increased the number of letters she wrote to 
university officials and the content became more pointed. 
 Houston and the NAACP debated back and forth on how to address both the damages 
and mandamus cases in light of limited funding and as of yet limited success.  Houston decided 
to drop the current damages case in favor of a new damages case based on Lincoln’s inability to 
provide graduate education.197  More importantly, Houston saw the most prosperous route was 
through the mandamus case, which the NAACP decided focus its efforts on.  Houston found the 
NAACP was best positioned “because of the preeminence of the University Of Missouri School 
of Journalism…[and] because of Lucile’s education and experience in journalism it will be 
harder to set up substantially equal graduate work for her than it was to set up the framework of a 
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law school for a beginner like Gaines.”198  If Houston could prove that dramatic inequality 
existed and Bluford was not offered an equal opportunity because of this inequality, the NAACP 
could potentially achieve another national precedent on a different aspect of segregation in the 
Upper South. 
As this internal debate played out, Bluford was offered a position with the NAACP.  
Bluford chose to pass on the position because if she did it “would lend credence to the defense 
charges that the litigation lack sincerity.”199  C.A. Franklin—Bluford’s supervisor—also objected 
to the proposed NAACP position since he felt Bluford was best needed in Kansas City.  Franklin 
also expressed pessimism on the prospects of realizing the potential of the Gaines precedent—
highlighting Kansas City’s success in integrating the defense industry.  There also appeared to 
still be disagreements between Franklin and Walter White, whom Franklin viewed as trying to 
rob The Call of quality staff members such as former news editor Roy Wilkins.200  The episode is 
significant because it does lend credence—in some ways—to the defense’s arguments of a 
conspiracy between Bluford and the NAACP.  It also demonstrates how highly the NAACP 
viewed Bluford not only by representing her against the University of Missouri but also as a 
cash-strapped organization extending a job offer.  The response by C.A. Franklin illuminated the 
cracks that were beginning to form in the support structure for the campaign for educational 
equality.  With the advent of World War II, civil rights campaigns and actions expanded and 
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time spent on behalf of one plaintiff did not appeal to many leaders loosely affiliated with the 
NAACP. 
Bluford’s Mandamus Appeal in the State Supreme Court 
 On May 15, 1941 in Jefferson City, Missouri, the NAACP and the Missouri’s counsel 
battled once again on the issue of the writ of mandamus for Lucile Bluford.  This time, however, 
the arguments were presented before the Missouri State Supreme Court.  W.S. Hogsett argued 
again that Bluford did not truly want to attend graduate school and was simply a puppet for the 
NAACP.  Houston and the NAACP contended again that Missouri had not provided graduate 
education for Bluford despite the Gaines decision.  Relatedly, Houston argued that Bluford was 
entitled to graduate education immediately and insisted that Bluford be admitted to the 
University of Missouri for the fall 1941 semester—a new twist to the case.  The Lincoln 
University School of Journalism was in the process of being built thus there was no way to 
determine the equality.   
Houston’s argument for a timetable now shifted the debate to when Bluford was entitled 
to graduate education and how long was acceptable for the state to respond to requests from 
black students for graduate education.  The Missouri State Supreme Court waited nearly a year to 
hear the appeal on the mandamus suit but was quick to deliver a verdict—on July 8, 1941—in 
favor of the defense.  Bluford was once again denied graduate education based on the fantasy 
that journalism education was readily available at Lincoln University.  The court’s ruling stated 
that both Missouri and Lincoln required “proper demand” for graduate education—a clear 
reference to the defense’s argument that Bluford did not inquire at Lincoln before applying to the 
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University of Missouri—and “reasonable time” for responding to those demands.201  Houston 
and Bluford in a press release pondered what constituted “reasonable time” since Bluford had 
applied to the University of Missouri two years before.  More than ever before, it was evident 
that the Missouri State Supreme Court, the Missouri legislature, and the university were stalling 
in the most extreme ways.        
    Specifically, Houston, despite the loss, found many positives in the court’s decision.  
The court did not agree with the defense’s argument that Bluford’s application was made in bad 
faith.  The court also decided that black students did not have to sue the Missouri board of 
curators “but merely bring action against Canada as registrar,” which would cut down on costs 
and simply the process.  Ultimately, the court decided that black students did not have to sue 
Lincoln University to provide education—a turn of the defense’s position that the burden was 
clearly placed with Lincoln University.  Houston expressed to Bluford that Missouri was “now at 
the pressure stage” since many in the legislature knew they could not continue to create graduate 
schools for every student.  Believing some in the legislature had been pushed to their limit, 
Houston and the NAACP needed more applicants to keep the pressure on and force the 
establishment of new graduate schools.202  
Starting Over and Avoiding the U.S. Supreme Court  
 Various Missouri courts handed the NAACP and Lucile Bluford multiple losses between 
the years 1940-1941.  Most of these losses were predicated on procedural errors made by the 
NAACP and Bluford and was helped along by the general evasion of the University of Missouri 
and the state legislature.  Despite the losses, Bluford’s case still held the most potential for the 
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NAACP in Missouri and nationally.  In late 1941, the internal debate shifted once again to 
figuring out how to continue the Bluford case without risking the Gaines precedent.  In letters to 
Thurgood Marshall, James M. Nabrit of Howard University and Louis Redding of Delaware 
gave their opinions on the course of action for the Bluford case.  Both agreed that Bluford and 
the NAACP should institute a new action in requesting graduate education and then bringing 
legal action against Missouri and S.W. Canada should they deny Bluford again.  Taking the 
advice of Nabrit and Redding meant essentially starting the process all over again.  Their concern 
with appealing the current case to the U.S. Supreme Court was that the appeal would “risk 
muddying up the Gaines decision because of technical and procedural errors.”203  Redding 
argued a potential federal appeal would give “the U. S. Supreme Court another opportunity to 
reaffirm its previous sanctioning, perhaps, at this time, with embellishment.”204  Houston, to a 
degree, disagreed.  Houston felt it necessary to petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. 
Supreme Court due to the blatant evidence showing that Bluford made obvious demands and the 
length of time that Missouri waited to respond to Bluford’s requests.  From a strategic 
standpoint, the time period constituted a turning point in how the NAACP addressed and moved 
forward with the Bluford case. 
The Building of Lincoln University’s School of Journalism 
 With the appropriation of the $65,000 from the Missouri Legislature, Lincoln University 
officials planned to break ground on a new journalism school though most of Lincoln officials 
still thought the appropriation was too small.  The deadline for completion was set for February 
1942 in order to satisfy the “reasonable time” requirement established by the court’s decision.  
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Houston, anticipating the inherent inequality of the future School of Journalism at Lincoln, 
continued to prepare for future litigation against the University of Missouri.  In the midst of the 
posturing by both the NAACP and the Missouri legislature, the Lincoln School of Journalism 
continued to be built albeit ever so slowly.  The start of construction began in the late fall of 
1941 and was not completed until after the February 1, 1942 deadline.  Bluford’s wait for some 
kind of journalism program now extended past two years since she made her first application to 
the University of Missouri in January 1939.   
Given Missouri’s resilience in maintaining segregated education, the crux of the 
continued NAACP efforts in Missouri rested on the equality of the Lincoln School of 
Journalism.  Houston and Bluford requested a course catalog from Missouri and Lincoln, the 
staff directories and credentials, and Bluford personally investigated the facilities.  It was 
obvious that the Lincoln School of Journalism was wholly unequal to its counterpart in 
Columbia.  The staff at Lincoln would have had less journalism experience than Bluford and 
Mitchell Hall—the home of the Lincoln Journalism School—was not comparable to the facilities 
at Missouri.  These discrepancies illustrated Houston’s belief that Bluford’s excellent academic 
record and substantial experience was invaluable to their efforts since the facilities and programs 
being established were more suitable for undergraduates or graduate students like Gaines and 
Murray who did not have prior experience in their field.   
Combining the Damages and Mandamus Suits 
 As 1941 came to a close, Bluford and Houston increased the pressure on both Lincoln 
University and the University of Missouri writing to both Scruggs and Canada.  Their 
correspondence emphasized that Bluford had given both parties “reasonable time” to establish a 
journalism school at Lincoln, which to this point had not been completed.  Each piece of 
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correspondence to Canada included an emphasis on holding him personally liable for the 
situation.  The pressure was necessary to make sure Lincoln established a journalism school and 
also to box Canada and Missouri into a corner when the case expanded to debate the equality of 
the future Lincoln School of Journalism. 
 Concurrently, the inner circle of NAACP lawyers both in the national office and in 
Missouri contemplated how to move forward with the case.  Houston and the others came to the 
conclusion that they would combine both suits—the personal damages suit and the mandamus 
suit—into one, hopefully accomplishing the goals of both suits.  Houston explained that under 
new federal rules they could combine both suits because though “the Federal courts cannot issue 
writs of mandamus…they have the power to issue injunctions which properly worded reach the 
same result.”205  The specific plan for Bluford was for her to file an application with Lincoln 
with an explicit letter outlining that she would not attend if she considered Lincoln’s journalism 
program unequal to the school at Missouri.  Once the application was filed and Bluford 
determined the unequal nature of the Lincoln School of Journalism, Bluford was to then apply at 
Missouri.  These strategic moves would focus all of the NAACP’s efforts, finances, and public 
attention on one final legal case in Missouri. 
The University of Missouri Abandons Graduate Work in Journalism 
 During the time Houston and the NAACP prepped the final push in the Bluford case, 
rumors started that Missouri had dropped its graduate work in journalism.  In a letter to Houston, 
W.S. Hogsett explained that graduate work in journalism at Missouri had been discontinued in 
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January 1942.  Houston was automatically suspicious of Hogsett’s claim.206  The supposed 
abandonment of graduate work in journalism complicated Bluford’s last appeal.  Houston now 
had to find out if in fact Missouri had truly abandoned graduate work in journalism and if it was 
done in a legal manner.  If so, the NAACP’s new case may have been null and void.  The official 
reasoning behind the abandonment was low enrollment due to World War II.  Though after 
Bluford’s last appeal in April of 1942, Bluford received a letter from Harold Wilkie, a pastor in 
Columbia, Missouri.  Wilkie confirmed that the university discontinued its journalism program 
on paper due to the decrease in enrollment.  However, Missouri faculty members were teaching 
graduate courses just not for graduate credit.  Wilkie also spoke with a student who declared that 
the closing of the graduate program was “a move to keep ‘the Negro girl’ from entering the 
school.”207  In addition to spending large sums of taxpayer money on segregated schools for such 
few students, Missouri demonstrated its willingness to close its own world-renowned journalism 
program to keep Lucile Bluford from attending. 
“The most vicious appeal to race prejudice”—The Final Appeal 
 On April 23, 1942, the federal district court called once again to argue and decide on 
Lucile Bluford’s petition for a writ of mandamus petitioning she be admitted to the University of 
Missouri School of Journalism.  After multiple trials and legal actions both sides seemed ready to 
prove their case for the final time.  Hogsett—S.W. Canada’s counsel—at the outset was excitable 
and needed to be calmed down.  Both counselors trudged through the myriad of rehashed 
arguments: Canada denied the admittedly qualified Bluford because of her race multiple times; 
Bluford had applied to the University of Missouri and Lincoln University in hopes of receiving 
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an adequate graduate education in journalism; Bluford also sought help from the NAACP, 
though the she did not feel it was a conspiracy to integrate; and Bluford was an already 
established journalist thus she did not need a graduate degree.  The defense, confident in their 
argument, “rested without putting on any evidence.”  The court instructed the jury to decide on 
one issue—the good or bad faith of Bluford’s application to Missouri’s School of Journalism.   
 Hogsett then responded with a slew of prejudiced arguments that painted an imposing 
picture of the NAACP for the all-white jury.  The NAACP leaders, in Hogsett’s argument, were 
intermeddling New Yorkers trying to alter the Missouri way of life and the laws that had always 
governed the state.  “Hogsett had talked so fast the truth slipped out and he had shown that he 
was standing on race prejudice alone.”  Houston recounted that prejudice was the only argument 
he could not overcome.208  The case was lost. 
Reasons for the Losses 
 Equipped with the Gaines precedent and a more than suitable plaintiff in Bluford, what 
were the reasons for the NAACP’s consistent losses in the Bluford trials?  Was Missouri learning 
and adapting from the Gaines decision?  Or was racism so entrenched as illustrated by the 
collusion in the Gaines case that there was nothing Charles Houston could do to guarantee a 
victory?  Those are important question to answer.  Though, many of the answers will only be 
speculative, Charles Houston did reflect on the aspects that were somewhat within his control.   
 First, Lloyd Gaines was still missing.  Gaines’ disappearance in Houston’s words would 
“rise to plague the N.A.A.C.P. again and again.”209  The NAACP won the Gaines precedent and 
utilized it in the Bluford case but the precedent had yet to be actualized by the winning plaintiff.  
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Thus the legal precedent still possessed some utility but in the eyes of the public and Missouri 
officials the Gaines precedent was practically useless without the original plaintiff.  If Gaines 
had been able to follow through with enrolling at Missouri or Lincoln’s law school, Bluford’s 
case would have taken a much different path. 
 Secondly, Houston wanted the NAACP to be more careful with their correspondence.  
Utilizing the little correspondence handed over by the NAACP, Hogsett and Missouri’s counsel 
sold the jury on the argument that the NAACP was orchestrating the case on behalf a plaintiff 
that did not want to actually attend graduate school.  If the NAACP navigated the 
correspondence with more caution, Houston would have avoided an important argument that 
built the majority of Missouri’s case against Bluford. 
 Lastly, the NAACP and its plaintiffs needed to follow the proper channels to qualify as 
“proper demand” for graduate education.  Playing by the unwritten rules set up by the 
legislatures, lawyers, and the state universities would have eliminated unnecessary arguments 
and allowed the NAACP to focus on the inequality of education provided to blacks throughout 
the United States.  Houston and others at the NAACP in the Missouri legal challenges learned 
how to avoid contentions and arguments that distracted from their true purpose in the campaign 
for educational equality: ending segregation in education. 
“Keep fighting”—The End of the Bluford Efforts 
 After the final trial in April 1942, Lucile Bluford applied to the University of Missouri 
for the last time in September 1942.  By the fall of 1942, Bluford had applied in Columbia with 
S.W. Canada every semester since January 1939 when she first started the process of applying.  
At the end of the April 1942, trial both sides were fatigued and worn-out arguing the same points 
over and over again save for minor changes and points of emphasis.  Missouri continuously won 
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the Bluford trials, but with the Gaines precedent looming the Bluford efforts seemed to end in a 
stalemate.  Missouri officials, however, felt the last court decision signaled a permanent end to 
the Bluford issue.  Hogsett now placed Bluford “in the nuisance class” and advised S.W. Canada 
that “no answer” was needed to Bluford’s continued correspondence.210   
Financially and mentally taxed, both Houston and Bluford decided to not pursue further 
legal action against the University of Missouri but waited for another potential plaintiff to 
continue their cause.  Edith Massey—a graduate of the Lincoln University School of 
Journalism—answered that call.  Massey and others who applied after Gaines and Bluford would 
not make a significant impact individually.  Nevertheless, collectively, the applicants would 
pressure university officials for nearly a decade before Missouri finally integrated its university 
by admitting just nine students in 1950.  The university and Missouri held fast for as long as it 
could in denying black students admission despite the courageous efforts by Bluford and Gaines. 
Conclusion 
 Lucile Bluford was curious.  Bluford was also forward and often agitated the status quo 
in her own unique way as a journalist and a private citizen.  Bluford and her legal case against 
the University of Missouri—Canada v. Bluford—are often overlooked as “the other girl that 
followed Lloyd Gaines.”  The lack of attention is rooted in the ultimate failure of legal case.  
However, framing Bluford v. Canada as a complete failure ignores the impact the case had on 
the development of the larger NAACP strategy.  The case is significant individually and also as a 
continuation of Gaines v. Canada.   The historical narrative is rich with information, stories, and 
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evidence that allow one to make distinct conclusions about Bluford, the connection of Missouri 
cases, and its place in the broader campaign for educational equality.  
 Bluford grew up in a household and in a neighborhood that valued civic activism, 
particularly with the NAACP.  This upbringing budded in her years at the University of Kansas 
where Bluford agitated the segregated status quo in Lawrence and on Kansas’ campus.  As 
Bluford—a young black woman—started her journalism career, she was never intimidated and 
took on the “hard news” of the day in a world primarily made up of men.  When Charles 
Houston needed another plaintiff to test the Gaines precedent, Bluford was primed and prepared 
for such a task.  Bluford academic and employment qualifications placed her in the category of 
“suitable plaintiff.”  But what separated Bluford from both Lloyd Gaines and Donald Murray 
was her lengthy and substantial activist tradition and upbringing making her a suitable NAACP 
plaintiff.  
Strategically, Donald Murray’s case against the University of Maryland was too easy; it 
did not set a precedent for all applicants. Lloyd Gaines’s case did set a national precedent but 
Missouri was still somewhat unprepared for that type of civil rights litigation.  Bluford’s legal 
action would be the first encounter of significant resistance and evolution of a defending state 
university—a foreshadowing of what the NAACP would encounter in other states.  Following 
the Bluford narrative, one can see how Missouri and its university strategized the stalling tactics 
and also how the officials attempted to satisfy the requirements sent down by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the Gaines decision.  
 Lucile Bluford and her efforts against Missouri provide a case study of who a typical—or 
extraordinary—NAACP plaintiff was.  What drove them to join the movement?  How did their 
background impact their decision?  What points were the NAACP and the plaintiff trying to 
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prove?  And how did the defense and plaintiff’s arguments evolve in the specific cases and trials 
and also in the context of other prior cases.  Bluford’s narrative gives a fuller picture and answers 
many of these questions serving to better understand the inner workings and the history of the 
early NAACP campaign for educational equality.  
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Chapter 3 
The Interconnected Nature of Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada 
 Lloyd Gaines and Charles Houston gave the NAACP a precedent-setting victory 
mandating the state of Missouri to provide graduate education to its black citizens.  With the 
victory, the NAACP broke down one barrier to equitable and integrated education.  To ensure 
the University’s of Missouri’s compliance with the decision, Lucile Bluford followed Lloyd 
Gaines by applying to its legendary School of Journalism.  Both legal cases—Gaines v. Canada 
and Bluford v. Canada—ended in disappointment as Gaines disappeared forcing the NAACP to 
drop the case, while Bluford’s case sputtered out despite its apparent strength.  From the 
narratives of both plaintiffs, it is clear that the national NAACP office and its special counsel, 
Charles Houston, invested a tremendous amount of time, resources, and energy into supporting 
the two legal cases against the University of Missouri.  This investment of time underscored the 
significance of both Gaines and Bluford to the NAACP’s efforts in the campaign for educational 
equality.  What has yet to be explored is why, specifically, the two cases are significant and how 
they should be historically framed.  In this chapter, there are two critical questions based on the 
historical narratives and their contexts.  The two interdependent questions are: how were the two 
legal cases significant to the NAACP’s campaign for educational equality?  And given the 
limited scholarship, how should we frame these two narratives in relation to their combined 
significance?  
 Much of the scholarship written about Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford is incomplete.  
The inadequate nature of the scholarship is not conducive to drawing larger conclusions about 
the two cases’ significance and the necessary historical framework.  Thus, an intervention is 
 
 112 
needed to move beyond simplistic understandings of the Gaines precedent and the oft-forgotten 
Bluford case that followed.   
In order to best understand and appreciate the significance of Lloyd Gaines, Lucile 
Bluford, and their legal attempts to be admitted to the University of Missouri, one must frame the 
two histories as one interconnected history.  This proposed framework is based on three levels of 
interconnectedness: a personal level, the interaction of the individual cases in the context of 
Missouri, and the two cases’ impact on the national NAACP legal strategy.  First, Lucile 
Bluford’s inspiration to enroll connected the two plaintiffs on a personal level, as the Gaines 
victory was the main source of Bluford’s inspiration.  The single anecdote highlights the 
underlying goal of the NAACP to inspire local people and NAACP branches to come forward 
and initiate additional legal cases semi-autonomously.  Secondly, both legal cases demonstrated 
a dependent evolution of Gaines v. Canada to Bluford v. Canada.  The evolution is best 
encapsulated in the events of the year 1939 when the end of Gaines v. Canada intersected with 
the beginning of Bluford v. Canada.  Lastly, the two narratives’ interconnected nature exhibits an 
execution of the NAACP’s strategic plans and the development of the broader, coordinated 
NAACP legal campaign.  Using the two plaintiffs, the NAACP attempted to integrate two 
different professional schools at the same university.  This strategy was key to the NAACP’s 
strategy, which aimed to effectively bankrupt the state and test its will to maintain segregated 
educational systems—a first in the campaign for educational equality. 
The significance of framing Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada as one 
interconnected history is that one can better understand the development of the legal campaign 
and the execution of NAACP supported legal cases in individual states and legal cases.  Mark 
Tushnet in his book The NAACP’s Legal Strategy against Segregated Education gives a brilliant 
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overview of how the national legal campaign originated and evolved.  There is also scholarship 
that explores specific cases and their respective importance.  However, the analysis of the Gaines 
and Bluford cases leaves a lot to be desired.  Exploring the intricacies of the Gaines and Bluford 
cases and the various points where they intersect builds specific and important connections as to 
how Charles Houston, the NAACP, and the individual plaintiffs moved strategically, 
pragmatically, and legally through history of the campaign for educational equality. 
Personal Influences—Lloyd Gaines as Lucile Bluford’s Inspiration 
 The NAACP’s national office and its leaders knew that to end segregation they needed 
assistance.  Charles Houston and Walter White understood that the long-term success of the 
NAACP’s efforts would only come to fruition if and when local branches extrapolated from the 
nationally led actions and court cases to start and execute their own.  At the beginning of the 
campaign’s development, both Houston and White planned to excite and inspire local people to 
carry the campaign for educational equality to the proverbial “next level.”  When local people 
had hope based on real victories, the NAACP reasoned, they would expand the movement and 
lessen the overall workload of the central NAACP leadership.211  The strategy was not 
completely realized as Lucile Bluford and her efforts were still strongly connected to the national 
NAACP office and its leaders—the case was in fact more centralized than Gaines v. Canada.212  
However, Bluford’s inspiration was exactly how Houston and White imagined the campaign for 
educational equality moving forward. 
 In the early 1930s, the Garland Fund nudged Walter White and the NAACP for details 
regarding their strategies to end segregation—the purpose of the proposed grant.  In a 
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memorandum to the Garland Fund in 1930, the Committee on Negro Work—which represented 
many of the NAACP’s interests—stated simply that legal cases and victories against educational 
segregation would “serve as examples and give courage to Negroes to bring similar actions.”  
The memorandum further explained, “though the suits of necessity will be entered in the names 
of individuals, the psychological effect upon Negroes themselves will be that of stirring the spirit 
of revolt among them.”213  The NAACP hoped that inspiring individuals and local branches with 
national victories and giving them the strategic blueprint the campaign for educational equality 
would spread much easier than in the beginning. 
 Lucile Bluford and the way she initiated her attempt to enroll at the University of 
Missouri exemplified this aspect of NAACP’s overall strategy and explicitly linked her to Lloyd 
Gaines and his NAACP legal case.  Admittedly, Bluford did not follow the Gaines case until he 
and the NAACP won in the U.S. Supreme Court.  This victory had sent shockwaves throughout 
the black community and press—though many were cautiously optimistic about the new 
precedent.  As the managing editor at The Call, a life long NAACP member, and a citizen of 
Missouri, Bluford oversaw the pervasive coverage of the Gaines victory by The Call and 
observed the black community’s reaction to the national news that had a local impact.  
Personally, the victory did not inspire an overwhelming sense of courage in Bluford to go out 
and challenge the University of Missouri but rather a journalistic-like curiosity, which achieved 
the same purpose.214  Discovering Lloyd Gaines could not enter Missouri’s Law School in the 
spring of 1939, Bluford thought about testing the university’s response to the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision and another qualified black applicant.  Acting on the Lloyd Gaines-inspired 
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curiosity, Bluford traveled to Columbia, Missouri and attempted to enroll in January 1939—a 
little over a month since the U.S. Supreme court delivered its opinion.  Bluford was denied.  The 
stated reason was due to the Gaines case being appealed by Canada and the University of 
Missouri, the university could not admit Bluford.  However, Bluford’s curiosity and subsequent 
action started a new and potentially successful NAACP legal case.  
 The significance of Bluford’s inspiration brought about by the Gaines victory is two-fold.  
First, the inspiration is the first and most direct connection between Bluford, Gaines, and their 
respective legal cases, which would become even more closely intertwined as the Bluford case 
progressed.  If Gaines had not won his U.S. Supreme Court challenge and also had not been from 
Missouri, Bluford would more than likely not have challenged the University of Missouri to 
adhere to the court’s precedent.  The core of this argument is magnified by Bluford’s assertion 
that she was not well informed about the earlier Gaines legal challenges.  Being a reporter and 
managing editor of a popular, black Missouri weekly publication, one would assume that Bluford 
followed or was partially aware of the Gaines legal case as it was of local and national interest.  
Yet, in an interview, Bluford admitted she was not tuned into the happenings of the Gaines case 
until he won in 1938.215  The Gaines victory effectively “stirr[ed] the spirit of revolt” in Bluford 
and she felt compelled to see what Missouri’s officials would do next if she applied.216  
Houston and White wanted press coverage of its major victories to inspire other black 
students to make their own challenges.  With the Gaines victory, they succeeded in influencing 
another potential plaintiff, Lucile Bluford, who based on her occupation and involvement with 
the NAACP should not have needed a dramatic victory to be aware of the need for more 
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plaintiffs.  However, the perfect situation—the Gaines case occurring in Missouri and him not 
being able to enroll until the fall of 1939— provoked a curiosity in Bluford that ultimately 
created new NAACP legal challenge.  Thus, there is a direct and personal link between her and 
Lloyd Gaines that validated the NAACP’s assertion that victories would bring about more 
plaintiffs. 
 The somewhat shocking admission by Bluford regarding the extent of her knowledge on 
the Gaines case is illustrative of the second significant aspect of the Bluford’s initiation of the 
legal case—the NAACP’s difficulty of finding other plaintiffs.  In the beginning stages of the 
campaign for educational equality, the NAACP was not successful in recruiting qualified 
plaintiffs to begin a new legal effort.  Despite winning the Donald Murray case against the 
University Maryland in 1935, the NAACP and Charles Houston could not entice many other 
undergraduate students to join their efforts.  After Gaines joined the NAACP efforts and applied 
to Missouri in the fall of 1935, Houston stepped up his efforts to get more plaintiffs after 
admitting to Sidney Redmond “frankly, the university program [had] slowed down to a walk for 
lack of suitable candidates both in the front line and in reserve.”217  Locally, lawyer Sidney 
Redmond experienced difficulties as well.  Around the time Gaines approached the St. Louis 
NAACP, Redmond had multiple no-shows to his office after reaching out to Lincoln University 
to attract graduating seniors.218  This difficulty of finding qualified plaintiffs magnifies Bluford’s 
importance since Bluford not only continued the Gaines efforts but to Houston and those 
involved nationally Bluford represented an internal victory to further the campaign for 
educational equality. 
                                                
217 Charles Houston to Sidney Redmond, December 26, 1935, folder 001509-014-0267 in Papers 
of the NAACP, Part 03: Series A. 
218 Redmond to Houston, August 17, 1935, folder 001509-014-0267 in Papers of the NAACP, 
Part 03: Series A. 
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 The narrative of Lloyd Gaines’ victory inspiring Lucile Bluford to pursue her own 
actions against the University of Missouri is, perhaps, a simple statement of fact.  However, 
Bluford’s Gaines-motivated curiosity exemplified one of the critical aspects of the NAACP’s 
strategy and created a direct and personal link between the two Missouri plaintiffs and their legal 
cases.  The connection also amplifies the difficulties the NAACP encountered when trying to 
find additional student plaintiffs to join their cause.  Lucile Bluford—an excellent plaintiff 
candidate—was one of the few students to respond to the call immediately after the landmark 
Gaines v. Canada decision, thus making her the first student supported by the NAACP to test the 
decision. 
The Missouri Context—Similarities, Evolution, and Interconnection of the Legal Cases 
 Expanding from the personal connection of the plaintiffs, the two legal cases of Gaines 
and Bluford are interconnected by the intersection of their legal cases and their implications in 
the context of the state of Missouri.  The evolving legal connections can be seen in the narratives 
developed in the prior two chapters but the point of time when the interconnected nature of the 
two cases is best illustrated is the year 1939.  During this year, the intersection of the two cases 
created a web of cause and effect that had implications for both cases and, as will be explained, 
the national NAACP campaign for educational equality.  This web can be broken down and 
simplified into the major events of 1939: the Gaines v. Canada victory (which occurred in 
December of 1938), Lucile Bluford’s attempt to enroll, the proposal and passing of the Taylor 
Bill, Lloyd Gaines’ disappearance, the filing of the Bluford legal suits, and the decision to drop 
the Gaines case.  By focusing on the year 1939, one can understand in a succinct manner how 
each of these events connected Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford in a context that focuses on the 
legal cases and Missouri.  The emphasis on the year 1939 does not explain all of the connections 
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of the legal cases since most of that is evident in the narratives.  However by examining the 
intersection of the two cases in the context of one year, 1939, one can best understand why the 
two cases need to be framed as one history that intersects and is firmly connected not two 
individual histories with some overlap. 
  In December 1938, Lloyd Gaines and the NAACP received the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
opinion on their case against the University of Missouri.  They had won.  The excitement and 
talk about the victory—despite being greeted with hesitant optimism—continued throughout the 
holiday season and into early 1939.  The NAACP just won a precedent declaring that Missouri 
had to provide education within its own borders.  Ideally, the NAACP wanted to follow through 
with the Gaines case making sure Gaines either attended Missouri’s Law School like Murray had 
in Maryland or Missouri established a segregated law school—if the latter was Missouri’s choice 
the NAACP would turn to a debate of equality between the two state law schools.  Either way, 
the NAACP possessed the ability to transform education in Missouri if not in the rest of the 
country as well.  Additionally, the NAACP wanted other students to apply for other graduate 
schools at Missouri.  More students would place more pressure on the Missouri administration 
and legislature and force them to make a decision about multiple segregated graduate schools. 
The impact of the Gaines precedent began to be felt immediately in January of 1939 when 
Bluford was inspired to test the decision by attempting to enroll at Missouri.  Lucile Bluford, as 
explained, became the NAACP’s second wave to hold Missouri—both the university and the 
state—accountable to the Gaines precedent.  The court’s decision spurred the reaction of the 
NAACP and Lucile Bluford to start a new effort, thus creating the first connection between 
Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada in the year 1939.  
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 After the U.S. Supreme Court delivered the Gaines opinion and Bluford tested s 
Missouri’s response, the next notable event occurred when the Taylor Bill—which allocated 
funds and gave authority to Lincoln University to establish a law school—was proposed and 
passed.  The legislative proposals had been brewing for some time and were discussed in internal 
documents by Missouri officials and lawyers.219  However after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision and Bluford’s new attempt to enroll, officials at Missouri and in the state government—
needing to respond—knew the time was right to propose the new legislation and attempt to 
maintain segregation.  The new legislation involved state officials, tax dollars, and an impact 
beyond simply the University of Missouri and the NAACP plaintiffs.  The Missouri state 
legislature’s new law expanded the reach of the NAACP’s legal cases to include the broader 
Missouri public. Gaines and Bluford had thus far demonstrated a collective purpose and the state 
legislature now needed to respond to the NAACP’s actions, their plaintiffs, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  In turn, the legislature reacted with legislation that would have be dealt with 
both Missouri officials and the NAACP. 
 On the surface, the Taylor Bill was a response to the Gaines decision and not necessarily 
an immediate reaction to Bluford’s attempt to enroll at Missouri.  However, the precedent of the 
Taylor Bill would hold unique implications for the NAACP’s Bluford strategy.  The Taylor Bill 
showed the NAACP that Missouri was willing to establish segregated schools and allocate a 
significant—though unequal—amount of funds to accomplish this goal.  The show of 
commitment to segregation made Bluford’s potential case against the University of Missouri that 
much more important to the NAACP.   
                                                
219 W.S. Hogsett to Frederick Middlebush, January 5, 1938, box 2582, folder 2597, University of 
Missouri President’s Office, Papers, Admission of Negroes, Lloyd L. Gaines case, State 
Historical Society of Missouri. 
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With only appropriating enough funds for the Lincoln Law School, the Taylor Bill further 
complicated Bluford’s case as nothing was inscribed in the bill about a potential journalism 
school at Lincoln despite Bluford’s attempt just a few days before the bill’s proposal.   The lack 
of funds for a journalism school guaranteed that some kind of new response from the Missouri 
state legislature would be needed.  Given Bluford’s resume and qualifications, the NAACP was 
hopeful that it could bring a successful case against Missouri sparking the creation of a 
journalism school at Lincoln University or admitting Bluford to the University of Missouri.  
Later, Missouri’s legislature did respond by following up the Taylor Bill two years later with an 
appropriation of a meager $65,000 to establish a journalism school at Lincoln University.  The 
Missouri legislature’s evolution of thought and action was a direct result of pressure by both 
Gaines and Bluford.  The Gaines victory prompted the Taylor Bill, which the Bluford efforts 
then made inadequate.  To respond, the legislature appropriated more money for a journalism 
school.  By utilizing Bluford along with Gaines, the NAACP had brought about the 
establishment of two costly, new graduate schools.  In doing so, Charles Houston knew that the 
NAACP could potentially break the Missouri state legislature financially, ultimately forcing the 
admittance of black students into the University of Missouri. 
 In October of 1939, it became apparent to Charles Houston and the team of St. Louis 
lawyers that Lloyd Gaines was missing.  The NAACP now had to defend a U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent without accounting for its plaintiff.  With Gaines missing and a sense of uncertainty, 
the NAACP decided to move forward with Lucile Bluford’s case by filing two suits against S.W. 
Canada, the university registrar.  Charles Houston thought he could hold off until Gaines was 
located but he was uncertain if Gaines would ever reappear.  Due to Gaines’ disappearance, 
Bluford’s cases were now more critical than ever before.  The NAACP needed to sustain the 
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pressure on Missouri and to hope that it could continue the Gaines case with or without Lloyd 
Gaines present.  The NAACP had readied Bluford’s case and its arguments over the course of 
year but Gaines’ disappearance made moving forward with Bluford’s cases vital to keep the 
NAACP’s prospects afloat in Missouri.  Eventually in early January of 1940, the NAACP ended 
the Gaines case and focused solely on Bluford. 
 Within this transition from Gaines to Bluford, there was a strong continuity of the 
specifics of both cases.  The central leaders for the NAACP and Missouri—Charles Houston, 
Sidney Redmond, and W.S. Hogsett—remained in place and Judge Dinwiddie of the Boone 
County Circuit Court heard both cases.  The continuity of the experienced leadership led to a 
logical evolution of arguments on both sides.  Bluford and Houston depended on the Gaines 
precedent to argue their case.  They wanted Bluford to be admitted to the University of Missouri 
quickly and argued that she did not need to wait since no journalism school was available for her 
to attend.  In the first trial, Houston made the connection between the two cases explicit when he 
be ended his argument by stating emphatically, “I rest on the Gaines decision.”220  The NAACP 
and Gaines had won the opinion that Missouri was required to provide graduate education within 
the state and Bluford now tested the Missouri’s resolve and adherence to this decision.  The 
Bluford case would evolve and take on its own characteristics but it was firmly rooted in Gaines 
case and its implications.   
 The evolution of the arguments and strategies over time between the Gaines and Bluford 
cases is apparent in their respective chapters.  However, the most notable and specific point in 
time when one can grasp why Bluford and Gaines need to be framed together is the year 1939 
and the events that occurred.  This year represented a dramatic intersection of the two legal 
                                                
220 “I Rest on the Gaines Decision,” photograph caption, Kansas City Call, February 16, 1940, 
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cases.  The major events of 1939—the Gaines Supreme Court decision, Bluford following 
Gaines with her own attempt to enroll at Missouri, the proposal and passage of the Taylor Bill, 
Gaines going missing, and the filing the Bluford suits—all demonstrate how both narratives are 
dependent on one another.  Lloyd Gaines and his legal case set off a chain of reactions that 
would reverberate throughout the Missouri State Legislature and the Bluford proceedings over 
the course of the next three years.  Framing the two narratives as inherently interconnected, 
allows one to better understand that these cases were not separate cases that followed one 
another but rather interrelated legal cases a part of the national legal strategy of the NAACP. 
The Significance in Nationwide NAACP Legal Strategy and Campaign 
 Positioned as two of the first few cases initiated in the campaign for educational equality, 
Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada greatly affected the NAACP’s coordinated legal 
strategy and accomplished, to some extent, the goals of the strategy’s theoretical framework.  
The ability to follow through with two significant cases over a period of seven years allowed the 
NAACP and its legal team to gain a better understanding of their strategy, the strategy’s 
implementation, and what types of responses they would encounter from state universities and 
legislatures.  This process triggered many alterations to the evolving campaign strategy, 
exhibiting what Tushnet termed “as “tactical flexibility” and “learning by doing.”221  However, 
the most significant impact of the two Missouri cases on the overall, national strategy and 
campaign was the realization of the NAACP’s goal to influence Missouri to appropriate 
substantial funds to establish segregated graduate schools.  With multiple requests for different 
graduate schools and the related increase of pressure from more black applicants and the black 
community, Charles Houston hoped Missouri and the University of Missouri would second-
                                                
221 Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal Strategy, p. 50, 68. 
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guess their commitment to segregation and admit students to the university—paving the way for 
integration.  Understood as one, interconnected history, the Gaines and Bluford cases show the 
first real example of how the national NAACP strategy and legal framework functioned.  
 Developing their plans and learning throughout the Missouri legal efforts, Charles 
Houston and the NAACP sought to overwhelm state universities with large numbers of 
applications and potential “airtight” plaintiffs.  If states such as Missouri tried to maintain 
segregation, they would have to create real universities, with ideally every graduate school and 
program available at white state universities.  This strategy would drain unnecessary resources 
and waste taxpayer funds on schools for a few black students.  An appeal to the states’ fiscal 
sensibility—or lack thereof—appeared to be the effective route to making segregation 
unsustainable. 
 This central tactic was not realized until Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford attempted to 
enroll at the University of Missouri and then brought legal action, which in turn prompted 
legislation responses.  Donald Murray’s victory in Maryland constituted a writ of mandamus for 
solely for his benefit.  The University of Maryland and the state of Maryland did not act in time 
to divert the NAACP’s case or respond to the best of their abilities.  Watching the Maryland 
proceedings from afar and having an already established scholarship program, Missouri and its 
university were more prepared to contend with the NAACP attacks.  Despite going up against the 
better prepared Missouri, Charles Houston and the NAACP were able to utilize both Gaines and 
Bluford as a tandem to make Missouri uncomfortable, commit significant funding to Lincoln 
University, and question segregation.  Given the surface-level lack of success of both cases, the 
actualization of one of the central tactics in the NAACP’s legal strategy is the legacy of the 
Gaines and Bluford efforts in Missouri.   
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 Together, Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford demanded two graduate schools be built—a 
law school and a journalism school.  Missouri eventually appropriated around $265,000 to 
establish both schools.  Spending over a quarter of a million dollars for so few students began to 
wear on some of the state representatives.  Houston indicated by July 1941 that some of “the 
more intelligent members of the legislature realize[d] that it [would] be impossible to open new 
schools every time a Negro applies.”222  Houston’s statement is exactly what he and others at the 
NAACP had planned.  Houston knew that their efforts would not always be as easy as the 
Maryland case.  The difficulties Houston foresaw necessitated a pragmatic strategy.  Forcing 
states to build numerous graduate schools through many legal suits was the center of Charles 
Houston’s pragmatic strategy  
 When the narratives of legal cases such as Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada are 
framed and discussed independently—or even somewhat connected—of one another, the wider 
significance is lost.  As early as 1930, the NAACP developed a strategy to force states into 
precarious financial situations if they chose to maintain segregation.  When Lloyd Gaines won 
his Supreme Court case, the situation in Missouri was primed to actually implement the strategy.  
By supporting Lucile Bluford, the NAACP followed the Gaines victory with another legal 
challenge that forced Missouri to establish two graduate schools at a high cost.  Unlike the legal 
cases prior, the Missouri efforts were the first time the NAACP was able to implement its 
nationally developed strategy.  Understanding the two Missouri cases as one, interconnected 
history illuminates this strategy and its broader significance whereas when the Missouri legal 
cases are framed independently the deeper understanding is left unexplored and unexplained.  To 
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go beyond the simple understandings of the two narratives, an interconnected framework is 
necessary. 
Conclusion 
 Expanding the narratives of Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford supports the contention that 
the two histories are inextricably linked.  To comprehend the entire historical context of the 
Missouri, the two cases cannot be separated.  The reasoning behind this argument is based on 
three levels of interconnectedness: the personal level, the case level in the context of Missouri, 
and the national strategy. 
 Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford—though they only met in person once right before 
Gaines left for Chicago—demonstrate a personal connection of their two respective legal cases.  
Before Gaines won his case before the Supreme Court, Bluford—a managing editor of the 
premier black weekly The Call in Kansas City—was not well versed in the Gaines case and 
arguments.  Once Gaines won, however, Bluford’s curiosity was sparked.  This personal 
connection to the abstract nature of a legal case on behalf of someone Bluford did not know 
exemplified one of the aspects of the NAACP’s strategy.  The NAACP believed that if it won 
national cases other black students would step forward to move the campaign for educational 
equality onward.  Inspired by Gaines on a personal level, Bluford took the necessary steps to be 
the next nationally recognized and supported plaintiff. 
 Within the context of both legal cases and the state of Missouri, Bluford v. Canada was 
clearly seen as an evolution and continuation of Gaines v. Canada.  On a deeper level, the two 
intersected tremendously and within the broader context of the state of Missouri during the year 
1939.  This year saw the Gaines decision truly sink into the nation’s mind, Bluford tested the 
decision, the Taylor Bill was passed, Gaines then went missing, and Bluford filed her first two 
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legal suits.  The intersection and cause and effect of all of these events serve to connect the two 
cases and set the stage for implications that would arise throughout the Bluford proceedings and 
within Missouri politics. 
 Nationally, and most importantly, the Gaines and Bluford cases represented the first time 
the NAACP employed one of its key strategies—making equalization fiscally irresponsible.  
Similar to the NAACP’s hope that victories would inspire people to step forward, the NAACP 
also foresaw states potentially attempting to comply with the Plessy v. Ferguson precedent in a 
more resolute manner than they had before.  Unlike Maryland, Missouri took this path giving the 
NAACP the opportunity to support two—and hopefully more—plaintiffs who attempted to be 
admitted to different graduate programs.  Missouri throughout both legal cases established a law 
school and a journalism school, which were not equal to those at the University of Missouri but 
still costly appropriations.  Herein lies the legacy of the interconnected histories of Lloyd Gaines 
and Lucile Bluford.  Both cases ended up failing to admit both students to Missouri.  However 
employing the national NAACP strategy, the Gaines and Bluford cases challenged the state of 
Missouri and at the same time established schools that though segregated served Missouri’s 
black community.   
 Understanding how Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada operated on the three levels 
demonstrates the two cases are interconnected on multiple analytical levels.  Framing them as 
such serves to help others better understand what these cases meant in the larger context of the 
national NAACP campaign for educational equality.  Understanding them as somewhat 
connected or independent of one another epitomizes what Houston and the NAACP were trying 
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to avoid—meaningless “isolated cases.”223  The early history of the NAACP’s campaign for 
educational equality would benefit from a new interconnected historical framework of Gaines v. 
Canada and Bluford v. Canada.           
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Conclusion 
 “The Sun Do Move,” Walter White wrote in a letter referencing the famous sermon by 
John Jasper after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lloyd Gaines.224  White’s reference 
underscored his disbelief about the Gaines outcome.  After nearly eight years, something truly 
significant and on a national level happened in NAACP’s campaign for educational equality.  
Progress had been made.  The Gaines victory was not a stopping point, however.  It was merely a 
step along the way to achieving the NAACP’s ultimate goal—integration.  The steps that 
followed required an interconnected legal strategy and many future legal cases.  The NAACP 
legal cases of Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada demonstrate how connected cases moved 
the NAACP’s campaign forward and boxed in the state universities and legislatures that 
maintained segregation.  Utilizing expanded and more in-depth narratives of both Lloyd Gaines 
and Lucile Bluford along with a new historical framework, this thesis argued that to best 
understand how the NAACP operated strategically in the campaign for educational equality one 
must recognize when histories need to be connected.    
 To come to this conclusion, the historical narratives of Lloyd Gaines, Lucile Bluford, and 
their respective legal cases needed to be further developed and strengthened.  With a more 
complete understanding of Lloyd Gaines as a plaintiff and his place in the campaign for 
educational equality, I was able to make an intervention into the limited scholarship.  The 
expanded biography and narrative of Lloyd Gaines shines light onto important aspects of his life 
most notably his feelings about his lack of opportunities and stability.  Also throughout college 
and early in his legal case, Gaines had a tendency to disappear or go off on his own without any 
communication.  Using the reoccurring themes of his personal life and his last correspondence, 
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one can better understand why Lloyd Gaines may have disappeared by choice.  Relatedly, these 
experiences and feelings Gaines held throughout his life suggest that he did not have time for 
significant activism and exhibited good will in applying for admission to the University of 
Missouri.  Once Gaines initiated his legal case and as the case traversed through the court 
system, Gaines’ counsel, Charles Houston and Sidney Redmond, encountered new challenges 
that were not present in the Murray v. Maryland case.  The NAACP lawyers dealt with a 
university, which was better prepared, and utilized more nuanced arguments to divert the 
NAACP’s efforts.  Ultimately, Houston and the NAACP had to prove that Missouri’s program to 
send black students who desired graduate school out of state on a minimal scholarship was 
unconstitutional.  The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, thus giving the NAACP a national legal 
precedent with which to work with to break down other barriers in higher education, particularly 
in Missouri. 
 Lucile Bluford followed Lloyd Gaines in hopes of holding Missouri accountable to the 
new U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  Being raised in a dramatically different background than 
Gaines, Bluford viewed her actions as purely strategic and as part of the larger campaign though 
Bluford’s involvement was inspired by the Gaines victory.  When Bluford first attempted to be 
admitted to the University of Missouri in 1939, the situation in Missouri was becoming more and 
more complex.  Missouri called Houston and the NAACP’s bluff and moved forward with new 
legislative plans to maintain segregation by giving Lincoln University more funds and authority.  
Bluford, as a new plaintiff, now aimed to make Missouri establish more costly graduate schools 
and programs to black students.  And once they did, Bluford would need to test their supposed 
equality.  Bluford’s efforts were not only influenced by Lloyd Gaines but also her efforts had to 
deal with the ramifications of the Gaines efforts and the U.S. Supreme Court precedent.   
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 Developing the two narratives surrounding Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford is helpful to 
the scholarship simply by creating much needed history.  Framing the two as one interconnected 
history, though, is a step toward a better understanding how the NAACP envisioned its strategy 
and its implementation throughout the country.  I argued that one should frame the two narratives 
as one, intersecting history due to the interconnectedness exhibited on three levels.  First, Lucile 
Bluford was inspired on a personal level to join the campaign for educational equality because of 
the Gaines victory.  This is a simple association between the two plaintiffs but the connection 
illustrates the NAACP strategy of inspiring others through major victories.  Secondly, the 
Bluford v. Canada was a logical outgrowth of Gaines v. Canada.  The individual cases within 
the context of Missouri demonstrate an obvious connection, which is best exhibited in the web of 
interaction during the year 1939.  Lastly, the two Missouri legal cases viewed together reveal 
how the NAACP hoped its legal strategy would corner states and state universities.  The 
utilization of both cases and plaintiffs to force one state and one university to establish new, 
costly graduate schools was the first realization of the broader NAACP strategy to make 
segregation fiscally irresponsible.  Never before had the NAACP a chance to implement this type 
of strategy using two plaintiffs in tandem to make a state’s situation worse financially.  For these 
three reasons, I argue that one must view Gaines v. Canada and Bluford v. Canada as one, 
interconnected history. 
 Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford occupy a critical testing stage for the NAACP’s 
national legal strategy for the campaign for educational equality.  After Donald Murray’s victory 
in Maryland in 1935, Charles Houston and the NAACP truly began to put in motion its 
coordinated legal strategy.  In Missouri with the Gaines and Bluford efforts, the NAACP’s 
coordinated legal strategy was realized despite the losses in court.  Not only did the NAACP win 
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a U.S. Supreme Court Precedent but also it was able to implement its strategy—based on the 
precedent—to try and put fiscal pressure on the state government.  The strategy called for at least 
two legal challenges and plaintiffs.  In Missouri, Lloyd Gaines and Lucile Bluford were those 
two plaintiffs.  Thus to best understand a strategy that depended on at least two plaintiffs and 
legal cases, it is beneficial to understand the historical narratives and analyses of Gaines v. 
Canada and Bluford v. Canada within an interconnected framework.   
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